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Abstract 
 
The study focuses on the political and economic geographies of pharmaceutical 
delivery. In 1997 the South African government passed the Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act, sparking outrage from both the local and 
international pharmaceutical industry, and resulting in court action in 2001. The 
industry believed that South Africa was in breach of its obligations under international 
intellectual property law. Those fighting for pharmaceutical security hoped the court 
case would be a ‘landmark’ in the global campaign for equitable access to medicines. 
This investigation seeks to analyse the domestic and international legacy of the court 
action. The inquiry takes its significance from the high prevalence rates of treatable 
diseases and the need for pharmaceutical security in South Africa and its 
neighbouring African countries. The absence of a sustainable international medicines 
delivery system is a global political, economic and moral failure. A solution is 
required that balances the positive productive forces of the market with a philosophy 
of justice and equity. 
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Introduction 
 
South Africa is a country in transition. Enhancing equity and upgrading service 
delivery are key concerns of the post-apartheid government. One of the core areas in 
need of development is South Africa’s health system. Establishing an equitable 
healthcare structure depends on numerous factors, one of which is access to safe, 
effective and affordable medicines. Achieving pharmaceutical security in South 
Africa has the potential to greatly improve the population’s health, particularly in the 
face of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
In a world shaped by the forces of globalisation the medicines delivery system 
is a truly international network. Research and development, manufacture and 
regulation, distribution and prescription span the globe. Decisions made at the 
headquarters of multinational pharmaceutical companies based in Europe or the 
United States are inseparable from the health of patients in South Africa. The 
medicines production network operates at multiple scales and transcends national 
borders. 
In 2001 the South African government was taken to court by the multinational 
pharmaceutical industry. The case centred on a piece of legislation that attempted, 
through various mechanisms, to enhance access to medicines in South Africa. The 
pharmaceutical industry regarded these mechanisms as unconstitutional and in breach 
of South Africa’s obligations under international trade law. Only two months into the 
legal case, however, the pharmaceutical manufacturers dropped their action against 
the government in response to considerable pressure from civil society, governments 
and multilateral organisations. The legacy of the court case is analysed in this study. 
The 2001 court action was a micro-space in which business and governance 
collided, where government policy and law met with global economic forces. 
International medicines delivery is a highly complex system. The South African court 
action provides an opportunity to focus diverse and multidimensional factors into one 
critical unit. Confining the study to a temporally and spatially specific moment 
enables broad universal themes to be analysed effectively. 
An assumption of this study is that the realms of business and governance are 
inseparable. The one is unable to act without the other. The provision of social goods, 
such as medicines, is tied into an integrated international political economy. Liberal 
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thinking may be too quick to dismiss the potential contribution of big business to 
social welfare. Many activists speak of the pharmaceutical industry in the same breath 
as tobacco or arms manufacturers. There is a tendency to dichotomise issues and 
actors into ‘good’ or ‘bad’; however, the global pharmaceutical delivery system is far 
more complex than this. Is it realistic to demand the provision of medicines for all, 
whilst simultaneously undermining the very industry that produces those medicines? 
One of the purposes of the research is to investigate whether a more balanced 
approach, inclusive and supportive of all stakeholders, would benefit pharmaceutical 
security. 
  The research investigates the degree to which the legacy of the court case 
goes beyond the borders of South Africa. The resistance the pharmaceutical industry 
faced was of global proportions, but did it have global consequences? Systems and 
networks consist of webs of power and influence; did the actions in South Africa in 
2001 alter the dynamic within the pharmaceutical web? The geopolitical fabric of the 
international pharmaceutical political economy is analysed to see whether South 
Africa’s position in the global and continental geography of therapeutic drug 
provision was affected. 
 The pharmaceutical delivery system stands at the intersection of a diverse 
range of disciplines. Medicine, Economics, Human Rights, Ethics, Politics and Law 
constitute the complexity of therapeutic drug provision. Geography also has the 
potential to contribute to addressing issues of pharmaceutical security. The discipline 
uniquely bridges the social sciences, whilst remaining faithful to concepts of scale, 
territory and space. Understanding the causes of differences and inequalities between 
places and social groups underlies many of the recent developments in Human 
Geography. 
 Adopting a geographical approach allows a thorough critique of current global 
medicines provision. An integrated approach is adopted that encourages simultaneous 
recognition of processes operating at the local as well as the transnational level, 
allowing for the conceptual mapping of the pharmaceutical delivery system. Such an 
approach is necessary in order to identify the numerous barriers to access that exist 
along the pharmaceutical production network and to examine the influence the 2001 
court action has had on these obstacles. 
 The thesis research here attempts to marry the market-based assumptions of 
Economic Geography with the structural preoccupations in Political Geography. The 
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investigation also recognises that medicine provision, whilst ruled by economic and 
political forces, is a matter of life and death. As such, an effort is made to introduce 
concepts of equity and justice to the political and economic spheres of pharmaceutical 
delivery. Profits and principles may not be mutually exclusive. Achieving 
pharmaceutical security in South Africa and elsewhere may well depend on finding 
the right balance between economic, political and ethical standards. 
 
******* 
 
 
The research was predominantly a ‘desktop’ study, with the vast majority of data 
obtained from secondary sources. The literature used comes from a wide variety of 
sources. Throughout the literature search, analysis and interpretation, there was an 
attempt to provide a representative sample of views. The literature comes from 
academic books and journals from a range of disciplines, including Geography, 
Politics, Economics, Public Health, Biomedicine and Philosophy. Pharmaceutical 
industry publications as well as government and civil society material were also 
consulted extensively. In addition, institutions such as the World Bank and World 
Health Organisation have produced significant volumes of literature that have been 
cited extensively throughout the research.1 
 
 
                                                 
1 A Methodology, including details of the primary data collection and a list of interview subjects can be 
found in Appendix A & B. 
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Chapter One: Health Inequity and the Body Politic 
 
The persistence of avoidable deaths from treatable illnesses in the developing world 
indicates a failure in the global health care system. An individual’s health is no longer 
just a concern for regional health services or the nation state; health is intimately tied 
to processes operating at the global level. As such, Medical Geography has the 
potential to greatly contribute to the analysis and understanding of local, regional and 
supranational determinants of health. A nation’s degree of pharmaceutical security is 
a crucial aspect of a functioning healthcare system.   
 
Pharmaceutical security and the injustice of health inequity.
  
 
Health inequalities exist. Inequality is an inevitable part of living in a diverse world. 
Inequity in health, however, is especially troubling. Inequity implies that the 
differentials between the haves and have-nots are avoidable, and that it is within our 
power to reduce the gap. This study begins with the assumption that a lack of access 
to medicines is inequitable and by extension unethical. At the core of the investigation 
lies a belief that allowing millions of people to live in pharmaceutical insecurity is a 
moral failure of the political and economic system. 
 The global health establishment has the financial and technological resources 
to bring pharmaceutical security to all people. Yet in spite of this one third of the 
world’s population and half of all people in Africa and Asia have no access to 
medicines (Orbinski, 2007; Forman 2007; Wijnberg, 2007).2 It is estimated that 
improving access to existing medicines could save ten million lives each year, four 
million of them in Africa and South-East Asia (Hunt, 2007; Ruxin et. al., 2005). The 
right to life is the most basic of all rights (Yamin, 2003). Medicines can be 
indispensable to life. Viewing pharmaceutical security as a matter of fundamental 
human rights forces recognition that death due to preventable diseases is an injustice. 
Just as in the case of food and famine, death from a lack of medicines is a 
socio-political failure. In the 1970s and 1980s famine was a serious worry for the 
                                                 
2 Roughly 79% of the global population without access to medicines live in low-income countries. 
Only 0.3% of those living in high-income countries lack access to medicines. The figure is roughly 
20% in middle-income countries (Leach et. al., 2005). 
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developing world, and numerous studies were conducted to examine the phenomenon. 
One piece of work became the seminal reference for all those that followed, Jean 
Drèze and Amartya Sen’s Hunger and Public Action (1989).  
 The opening paragraph of this classic insists that, 
 
  No social or economic problem facing the world today 
  is more urgent than that of hunger. While this distressing  
state of affairs is not new, its persistence in spite of the  
remarkable technological and productive advances of the  
twentieth century is nothing short of scandalous (Drèze &  
Sen 1989, p. 1). 
 
 What applied to food security twenty years ago translates equally well to 
pharmaceutical security in the twenty-first century. With over 50% of people lacking 
access to medicines in some areas of Africa, it may not be too extreme to assert that 
these regions are facing ‘pharmaceutical famine’. Drèze and Sen proposed that famine 
was rarely due to crop failure; more often it was a social phenomenon caused by 
entitlement failure. Death from preventable diseases should also be considered a 
social phenomenon. 
 Pharmaceutical security has developed into a social phenomenon as the 
delivery of healthcare has become commodified. From a purely economic view, 
healthcare is a commodity like many others in the service sector (for example, hair 
cuts or car repairs). From that perspective, the creation of effective new medical 
treatments is an intellectual achievement like many others (for example, the creation 
of new music or software). From a moral standpoint, however, there is significant 
difference between poor people not being able to get their hair cut and poor people 
lacking access to life-saving medicines (Pogge, 2005). Pharmaceutical products 
directly affect the health of a nation. They are irreplaceable. Functional – if not 
optimal – substitutes can be found to address inadequacies in other components of 
treatment, for example different infrastructure or alternative health providers. In 
contrast, no amount of administrative creativity can provide comparably effective 
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substitutes for a treatment such as Antiretroviral therapy (Shadlen, 2007). If 
medicines are not available, in most cases treatment is impossible.3 
 Alongside the presence of skilled health professionals, medicines form the 
foundation of all healthcare systems. In the developing world a far higher proportion 
of national health budgets is spent on medicine procurement than in the developed 
world. In sub-Saharan Africa 74% of the average health expenditure is on medicines, 
whereas only 7.4% is spent in developed countries (Foreman, 2002). Consequently, 
developing country health systems are far more price sensitive than those in 
developed countries. Not only do high prices for pharmaceuticals directly impact 
upon health budgets, they may also discourage resource mobilization (Shadlen, 2007). 
High prices can serve as a disincentive to invest in the development of healthcare 
infrastructure, as a clinic is next to useless without a supply of medicines 
Pharmaceutical equity is dependent upon both the availability and accessibility 
of medicines. Availability relates to whether a medicine exists, accessibility involves 
consideration of whether an existing medicine can be obtained by a doctor or patient. 
Production and supply precede access (Shadlen, 2007); activists and policy makers 
can only focus on the steps needed to acquire medicines if they exist. The existence of 
a medicine is dependent upon whether a developer, normally a pharmaceutical firm, 
has invested in research and development in a therapeutic area. Development 
priorities are driven by commercial value or return on investment, the problem facing 
the poor is that their illnesses are not as profitable as those found in the developed 
world, resulting in a severe research gap. 
One of the central assumptions of this investigation is that some medicines are 
more valuable than others. Here, value does not reside in profits but in terms of 
therapeutic significance (impact on mortality and morbidity). Only 10% of the $55 
billion (R424 billion) annual global spending on health research is devoted to diseases 
or conditions that account for 90% of the global disease burden (Idris & Arai, 2006). 
Research into the “big three” infectious diseases (tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and 
malaria) is relatively well funded, however there exists a group of neglected diseases 
that receive minimal research attention. There is a desperate need for new medicines 
to control the re-emergence of human African trypanosomiasis and to replace current 
                                                 
3 Western public health scholars are often too quick to dismiss herbal and traditional medicines. There 
is a growing body of evidence that suggests that the traditional medicines found in parts of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America can have a significant therapeutic value for some conditions. 
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treatments for chagas disease, whilst diseases such as dengue fever and ebola remain 
untreatable (Ford, 2006). Market mechanisms that control pharmaceutical research 
have failed patients suffering from these infectious diseases.4 The balance between 
commercial value and therapeutic or social value lies at the heart of the efforts to 
achieve pharmaceutical security. 
 
 
 
   
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The multidimensional factors limiting drug access (Tetteh, 2008; t'Hoen, 
2002; Shadlen, 2007; Leach et. al., 2005)  
 
Many factors contribute to medicines inequity. This study focuses on the 
pharmaceutical industry and the ex-manufacturer price of medicines, but this is only 
one piece of a much greater puzzle. Whilst the pharmaceutical industry produces the 
medicines used to combat diseases, it is not responsible for distribution of treatments, 
diagnosis of illness, or prescription of a product. For example, the manufacturer’s 
price represents only part of the cost to a consumer. The end price of a medicine 
includes government taxes, distributors’ and retailers’ margins. The WHO calculates 
that in developed countries, the manufacturer’s price typically represents 50%-60% of 
                                                 
4 Market failure and research and development priorities will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 
Three. 
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the final consumer price, while in some developing countries up to 80% consists of 
import duties, taxes, distribution costs and dispensing fees (Foreman, 2002). The 
various dimensions of ‘access’ (Figure 1.1) emphasize the need for differentiated yet 
simultaneously operating access policies at the global, national and regional scale 
(Tetteh, 2008). 
The multidimensional factors that shape a country, a region or an individual’s 
degree of pharmaceutical security require multi-disciplinary conceptual analysis. The 
following section argues that modern Medical Geography can provide the framework 
required for critical engagement with concerns over inequitable access to medicines. 
 
The body politic: beyond biology 
 
Medicine is a social science, and politics nothing  
but medicine on a grand scale –Rudolph Virchow  
1848 (cited in Cooper et. al., 2007a, p. 29) 
 
All social organisms have an environment to which they relate. Despite the fact that 
the immediate cause of a disease may be a virus, the institutions and practices of 
society are largely responsible for creating the conditions within which disease-agents 
either flourish or die (Meade & Earickson, 2000; Gesler et. al., 1997). For many years 
Medical Geography failed to recognise the importance of the social, economic, 
political and cultural influences on an individual’s health. The sub-discipline has for 
too long been a tool of biomedicine. 
Classical Medical Geography can be divided into two parts. 5 First, spatial 
epidemiology engages the core principles of geographical thought – distance, 
direction, location and distribution – for the purpose of establishing a correlation 
between disease and physical environment (Litva & Eyles 1995; Eyles & Woods, 
1983). Examples of such studies include those investigating malaria distribution in a 
country, measles diffusion in a region and suicide rates in a metropolitan area (Eyles 
& Woods 1983). Such studies take what Litva and Eyles (1995) call a “structural 
                                                 
5 For more detailed accounts see Eyles and Woods (1983), Gesler, Bird and Olieski (1997), Meade and 
Earickson (2000), Gatrell (2002), Curtis (2004), Litva and Eyles (1995), and Jones and Moon (1987). 
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functionalist” approach – this is a positivist exercise based on quantitative methods 
using concrete numerical data (Gesler et. al., 1997).  
 The second main part of classical Medical Geography is study of the spatial 
distribution of health services. Issues such as the impact of location on facility 
utilisation and analysis of spatial resource allocation policies are at the core of such an 
approach (Eyles & Woods, 1983). The health services that have been analysed have 
typically been limited to personnel and medical facilities rather than medicines. 
Studies also tend towards the regional or national scales and rarely deal with global 
structural patterns and processes. 
 Traditional divisions between the economic, social, political, cultural and 
environmental spheres have increasingly become irrelevant within Geography 
(Painter, 1995). This erosion of boundaries is also reflected in the sub-discipline of 
Medical Geography. It has become generally accepted that there is a need to go 
beyond the biological determinants of health. Medical Geographers are now aware of 
the need to situate health among the structural processes operating within society; and 
are inclined to look beyond the human body to the ‘body politic’ (Jones & Moon, 
1987; Brown & Duncan, 2002; Gatrell, 2002). 
 Situating health within a socio-political framework complements principles of 
public health that emerged in the late 1970s following the International Conference on 
Primary Health Care at Alma Ata (1978). ‘The public health attitude’ forms the core 
of the majority of national health systems across the globe (Brown & Duncan, 2002). 
A crisis such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic has had wide ramifications for public health, 
destroying the boundaries separating such previously distant concerns as health, 
gender, sexuality, trade, property rights and human rights (Petchesky, 2003). In 
response, issues of access to medicines require a global framework for study and 
action. A nation-state’s health policies are not insulated from the outside world. On 
the contrary they are fundamentally integrated within global political and economic 
structures. Consequently, without wanting to put the study in an intellectual box, a 
largely structuralist approach will be adopted in this investigation.6   
Structuralist analyses of medicine start with the assumption that health is 
embedded in the political economy. Essentially, structuralists focus on power and 
                                                 
6 Gatrell (2002) identifies five approaches to geographies of health and provides a detailed account of 
each of them. The five approaches are: positivist, social interactionist, structuralist, structurationist and 
post-structuralist.  
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domination and the way they are expressed across space through various structures, 
such as governments, multilateral organizations and multinational firms (Sprague & 
Woolman, 2006). 7 The South African lawsuit, considered in subsequent chapters, 
exemplifies the kind of power politics that sit at the heart of structuralism.  The 
framework provided by the structuralist political economy allows Medical 
Geographers to critically interrogate power politics and the influences it has on global 
pharmaceutical delivery.  
  
  
 
                                                 
7 For a more detailed account of the structuralist school see Gatrell (2002) and Johnston et. al. (2000). 
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Chapter Two: International Political Economy in 
Medical Geography 
 
The intention throughout the work is to present an integrated theoretical/conceptual 
framework into which the research findings can fit. In the same way as an individual’s 
health is inseparable from economic processes and political decisions, the theories 
that underpin these interactions cannot be forced into convenient intellectual boxes. A 
number of academic theories are presented in the forthcoming chapter, however, 
whilst they may originate from various subjects and sub-disciplines they all fit within 
and contribute to the architecture of a global pharmaceutical political economy. 
A structurally determined international political economy (IPE) provides an 
appropriate conceptual framework for critically analysing the extent of and the 
reasons for health care inequity in its various guises. The IPE concept is well 
positioned within the social sciences to tackle the multidimensional complexities of 
the pharmaceutical delivery system. The interdisciplinary nature of IPE means that the 
flows of power, wealth and knowledge that characterise the global healthcare system 
can be analysed as a whole, rather than in isolation. 
 
Globalisation and health: Geopolitics as health diplomacy 
  
The interdependence produced by globalisation has broken down the traditional ways 
of conceptualising the medical, economic, political and technological means to 
improve health.8 These formerly separate spheres have become linked across 
economic and political space.  
At any location on the earth’s surface there are both vertical and horizontal 
relationships. The vertical relationships link different elements in the same location, 
whereas the horizontal relationships link elements in separate locations (Johnston, 
1983; Johnston et. al. 2000). In order for a government to craft health policy it must 
manage both the horizontal and vertical relationships. In the process of doing this it 
adopts mechanisms that spill into and out of every country.  
                                                 
8 The vast literature surrounding globalisation can mystify rather than clarify. This study will not 
attempt to wade through the many diverse accounts of the process of globalisation. Rather, the 
investigation is more concerned with its influence on how a geographer conceptualises health. Phillips 
(2005) provides a thorough and topical account of globalisation. 
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Despite claims by hyper-globalists that the nation-state is redundant, states 
remain core actors within global health diplomacy. It is the task of national 
governments to reorient their health and foreign policies in ways that align their 
national interests with the political, economic and epidemiological realities of a 
globalised world (Drager & Fidler, 2007). Such a task goes beyond classical 
diplomacy. Governments must now bargain with non-state as well as state bodies.  
Constructing global health from state-centric perspectives bypasses one of the 
most significant developments in the global health governance structure, itself a “new 
political space”.  There are numerous organisations occupying this space, which have 
seized opportunities to influence global healthcare delivery (Figure 2.1). Health 
activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), global philanthropists and the 
private sector have competed eagerly for resources and political attention and are 
engaged in constant flux between coalition and competition (Kickbusch, 2003). The 
capacity to influence health status and outcomes cannot be assured through national 
actions alone because of the intensification of cross-border and trans-border flows of 
people, goods, services, and ideas (Dodgson et. al., 2002). Ignoring these flows and 
organizations, particularly when dealing with issues of pharmaceutical delivery, 
would be to ignore powerful processes within global healthcare. A government 
seeking to maximize the welfare of its population must actively engage and form 
constructive relationships with these forces.  
An age of medical geopolitics is emerging in which states are realising the 
global significance of health concerns such as HIV/AIDS, avian flu, and bio-
terrorism. The recognition that health is a crucial determinant of development and 
security has pushed medical issues higher up the international agenda (Traulson & 
Almarsdottir, 2005; Loeppky, 2004). After being consigned to ‘low politics’ for so 
many years, health is now regularly dominating talks at the United Nations and World 
Trade Organization. ‘Global health security’ was a significant theme at the session of 
the Executive Board of the WHO in January 2008. ‘Health security’ is equated to the 
activity required to minimize the impacts of acute public health crises that endanger 
populations living throughout different geographical regions (WHO, 2008a). 
Increasing access to medicines is an activity that certainly furthers health security.  
Throughout the history of Geopolitics the discipline has always been 
associated with the analysis of global rivalries in world politics (Taylor, 1993), and 
the consequences these have for a population’s security. Constructing a specific 
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definition of geopolitics is notoriously difficult; the meaning of the concept has 
changed over time as structures of the world order have altered (O'Tuathail, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The Global Health Governance Structure. (Source: Dodgson et. al. 2002, 
p. 22.) 
 
 During the early years of Geopolitics in the late 19th and early 20th century it 
was understood as part of Western imperial knowledge dealing with the relationship 
between the fixed physical features of the earth and politics (Agnew & Corbridge, 
1995). Following this the discipline became associated with the notorious Nazi 
foreign policy goal of Lebensraum (the pursuit of more ‘living space’ for the German 
nation). During the Cold War it was used to describe the global contest between the 
Soviet Union and the United States of America (O'Tuathail, 1998). In recent years the 
subject of Geopolitics has enjoyed a revival (but with little agreement as to its precise 
meaning and influence) as foreign policy makers, strategic analysts and academics 
have struggled to grasp and express the dynamics of the global political economy 
(Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; O'Tuathail, 1998). 
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ILO = International Labour Organization; IMF = International Monetary Fund; 
MNCs = Multinational corporations; NGOs = Non-governmental organisations; 
UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNFPA = United Nations Fund 
for Population Activities; UNICEF = United Nations International Children’s Fund; 
WHO = World Health Organisation; WTO = World Trade Organisation. 
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 Geopolitics tackles the ‘big picture’, offering a way of relating local and 
regional dynamics to global processes. Through a spatial approach it arranges actors, 
elements and locations into networks. After the end of the Cold War and the rapid 
globalisation of economics and politics, there has been a great effort to establish the 
boundaries of a ‘new geopolitics’. Some commentators see a new political order 
dominated by geo-economic forces: where transnational flows of capital are changing 
the nature of states, and questioning the sovereignty and geopolitical structures that 
have previously dominated the planet (O'Tuathail, 1998). Since the end of the Cold 
War a number of international conferences and treaties on the environment, 
development, human rights, population and health have suggested that a new era of 
transnational cooperation has arrived (Dalby, 1998). Geopoliticians have a 
responsibility to interrogate such initiatives and analyse them critically. 
Four main approaches to inquiry can be singled out within Geopolitics.9 First, 
traditional geopolitics is associated with imperial expansion and the geostrategic 
advantages of land power. Second, the power-relations perspective focuses on the 
hierarchical nature of the global order and issues of power equilibrium. Third, critical 
geopolitics focuses on the meanings and forms of representation that underpin 
geopolitical spaces. A fourth approach, political economy, encourages a wider and 
more nuanced consideration of geopolitics (Johnston et. al., 2000; Agnew & 
Corbridge, 1995). This last approach, adopted throughout the study, goes beyond 
preoccupation with the state.  
Military security has traditionally been at the core of geopolitics, but there is 
increased recognition that other forms of security are becoming important. Relative 
economic power has begun to displace military force as a central feature of 
international relations. Technology, education and economic growth have become 
more important than conventional geopolitical attributes in determining success in the 
international system (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995). A state’s or region’s economic 
security has become a concern of ‘new geopolitics’. Pharmaceutical security, as a 
vital component of a nation’s health, is essential to the maintenance of economic and 
political stability. 
The power of multinational corporations (MNCs) now dwarfs that of many 
states (Dalby, 1998). These firms can have a sizeable influence on a nation’s 
                                                 
9 For a detailed account of the four approaches see Johnston et. al. (2000). 
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economic, and by extension, political security. Consequently, there are calls for 
Geopoliticians to move away from their preoccupation with the nation state towards a 
critical understanding of other power-wielding agents (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995). In 
this study Geopolitics is positioned as the analysis of divisions within global space 
through institutions such as states, firms, social movements and international 
organizations. This division results in the formation of distinct territories and spheres 
of political and economic influence through which the IPE is regulated. IPE is realised 
geographically through practices and ideas which are socially constructed rather than 
naturally occurring (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995). The ability of different localities and 
regions in the IPE to adapt to changing circumstances is not merely the result of 
natural resource endowments indeed, the processes of change and influence are far 
more subtle and dynamic than the traditional geopolitical framework recognises. 
 
International Political Economy: the dynamics of power and 
wealth 
 
The struggle over access to medicines is a case study of the fluidity and tenacity of 
global power structures (Petchesky, 2003) and the influence these structures can have 
on an individual’s entitlement to health. International Political Economy (IPE) is the 
study of the interplay between power (politics) and wealth (economics) in the global 
arena. IPE allows for a twin focus on power and wealth motives at the micro-level and 
the political organization of international capitalism at the macro-level (Guzzini, 
1998). The basic tenet of the political economy approach is that human experiences, 
including illness, arise from social relationships (Gesler et. al., 1997). It recognises 
that health is a social as well as a biological quality, embracing the concept of the 
‘body politic’. 
Structuralism sees the political economy as necessarily conflictual (Frieden & 
Lake, 2000). Human existence is filled with elements of tension, and with boundaries 
where differing and sometimes conflicting interests or value systems collide (Balaam 
& Veseth, 2001). All production and consumption networks are subject to a 
multiplicity of geographically differentiated political, social and cultural influences. 
Political pressure groups and politicians have as much influence on economic 
outcomes as the laws of the marketplace (Dicken, 2003; Frieden & Lake, 2000). This 
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is particularly true for the pharmaceutical production network; due to the politically 
sensitive nature of pharmaceuticals the industry is one of the most highly regulated 
and publicly scrutinized. The pharmaceutical market is intimately integrated into 
national and supranational political processes.  
As geographers began to focus on health inequalities it became clear that the 
way countries organised their healthcare systems had a major influence on the 
dimensions of healthcare inequalities (Meade & Earickson, 2000). As a result, since 
the early 1980s the political economy or structuralist approach has been championed 
by a small group of progressive Medical Geographers (Eyles & Woods, 1983; Jones 
& Moon, 1987; Gesler et. al., 1997).  
 The primary focus of political economy within Medical Geography has been 
the national economy’s impacts on healthcare provision (Lee & Zwi, 2003; Gesler et. 
al., 1997). There has been little acknowledgement of the ‘I’ in IPE. The preoccupation 
with the national or regional determinants of illness risks neglecting the multi-scalar 
nature of global health. The permeability of national borders and the effect which 
international forces have on healthcare necessitates consideration of global processes 
by Medical Geographers. There are a multitude of national and local factors that 
determine access and use of healthcare (Figure 2.2). Such schematics are reproduced 
in a whole host of Medical Geography books, the majority of which, however, 
overlook the supranational elements of health inequity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 2.2 A schematic model of healthcare access and use (Source: Curtis, 2004, 
p.115) 
Administrative/political 
structures.
•National ideologies of healthcare.
•National wealth made available for 
healthcare.
•Healthcare as social production
•Local variation in democratic 
political processes affecting 
healthcare.
•Local differences in healthcare 
organization and management.
Individual Factors
•Health beliefs
•Preferences and values
•Knowledge and perceptions
•Health status
•Attitudes to healthcare.
Social influences affecting
consumption
•Value systems of capitalist consumer 
societies.
•Local practices of consumption.
•Cultures of social support and informal
caring.
Physical infrastructure and
spatial access
•Historical investment and development
of health service infrastructure.
• Distribution of facilities in relation to 
population served.
•Distance decay effects.
•Inequalities of access opportunities at the
local level.
 
 
 
 
17
 
 
 Qualitative changes in the dynamics between polity, market economy and civil 
society mean that geopolitical space is constantly shifting. As a consequence, health 
becomes patterned within society, with some groups achieving consistently better 
standards than others (Litva & Eyles, 1995). Such social injustice is the focus of 
conflict theorists working within Medical Geography, and provides a useful 
conceptual overlap with structuralism. Conflict theorists believe that social injustice 
stems from imbalance in the power dynamics of the political economy. They are 
concerned with how international governance is shaped by the interactions between 
subordinate and super-ordinate groups, and the conflicts that may arise from these 
interactions (Litva & Eyles, 1995; Ruggie, 1998). The South African court case of 
2001 (detailed in Chapter Four) is a prime example of a conflict arising from such 
interactions. 
 Significantly, conflict theorists do not claim to be objective researchers. 
Research topics and the commitment to use their findings are all seen as reflecting the 
political and economic interests of the researcher. Medical Geographers informed by 
conflict theory seek to expose injustice (Litva & Eyles, 1995) and propose pragmatic 
solutions to inequity. Objectivity is impossible when dealing with an issue as 
important and emotive as pharmaceutical security. As such, the first assumption of 
this investigation was that inequitable access to medicines was an injustice and that it 
was symptomatic of global political and economic failure.  
In order to understand the processes resulting in so many people lacking 
pharmaceutical security it is necessary to consider the political and economic aspects 
of medicine delivery. The relationship between the state and market is central to any 
investigation into inequitable access to medicines. 
 
State-market relations: the diffusion of global power 
 
Neither the state nor the market is primary within the global medicines delivery 
system. Since the study of IPE began, from the writings of John Stuart Mill to Karl 
Marx, there has been recognition that “pure markets” are a myth. Every market 
system is embedded in and affected by social and political realities (Prusak & Cohen, 
1998). This is particularly true in the health sector. Governments play an important 
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role in the regulation of health consumables to prevent dangerous practices and to 
control costs (Bloom & McIntyre, 1998). Consequently, firms, such as those in the 
pharmaceutical industry, have little choice but to engage with states and to tailor their 
policies to the regulatory environment. 
The relationship between capitalist corporate actors and the state is continually 
evolving. The IPE is a network of bargains between and among states and markets. 
This web of interdependence (Figure 2.3) determines the production, exchange and 
distribution of wealth and power across the global arena (Balaam & Veseth, 2001). As 
such, power is increasingly diffuse. The state is no longer the single mechanism 
through which security, production, credit and knowledge are distributed 
internationally (Guzzini, 1998; Cerny, 2000). In order to maximize their profits and 
compete with their rivals, corporate institutions have pushed hard to influence 
international trade negotiations (Loeppky, 2004). They have achieved this by 
operating at the interface between ‘wealth’ and ‘power’; the global firm has become a 
political as well as an economic force. 
Keeping up with the shifting international economic environment has become 
a major challenge for domestic policy makers. Global economic rules increasingly 
penetrate state borders and can constrain domestic laws and regulations, emphasizing 
the permeability of the modern nation state and the polycentric nature of the global 
political economy (Lanoszka, 2003; Dicken, 2003). The degree of state autonomy is 
often debated when considering IPE. In the case of health, a number of international 
trade rules risk interfering with the ability of states to develop their own healthcare 
systems (Sinclair, 2006; Forman, 2007).  The flow of medicines into and within 
resource poor countries is inextricably linked to wider systematic issues related to 
international and regional trade agreements (Ruxin et. al., 2005). The General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights10 (TRIPS) are prime examples of such 
international laws. 
Much of the world is shaped and understood in terms of law. Everyday 
concepts of authority, obligation, justice, and individuals’ relations to institutions such 
as the state are all structured in part, by legal norms, discourses and practices 
(Blomley et. al., 2001). Law has a geography. It has a place, scale and environment, 
                                                 
10 The following chapter analyses the consequences of TRIPS for equitable access to medicines.  
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and can be situated in a particular cultural, economic and political context. Human 
rights are pre-legal; they underlie a nation’s legal system and whilst they should be 
independent from the state their realization is strongly associated with citizenship of a 
specific country (Verschraegen, 2006; O'Manique, 2007; Joseph, 2003).  This 
investigation, therefore, goes beyond the narrow definition of law as rules. Instead, it 
considers law as the presence or absence of opportunities for states to protect the 
rights of its citizens through legislative means. 
Legal mechanisms define the realm of the possible by establishing the 
boundaries of what is acceptable. A more interesting and useful exercise than the 
analysis of an individual law is examining the interests and capacity of actors to take 
advantage of the opportunities sanctioned by that law (Shadlen, 2007). By adopting 
this broad view of law it is possible to arrive at the realm of politics. In the face of 
market forces pushing for global unity in trade law, politics has increasingly become 
preoccupied with exploiting the opportunities presented by such legislation as TRIPS 
and GATS. The politicisation of economic decisions can be seen as most common for 
states at moments of active change (Goddard et. al., 1996). Thus, post-apartheid South 
Africa found itself, and still finds itself, in a transitional state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 The web of interdependencies in the global political system (Source: 
Dicken, 2003, p.79) 
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The global pharmaceutical production network 
 
Medicines are commodities. Conventionally, economic geographers study the 
production of commodities and their movement across space and time through linear 
models, such as the Global Commodity Chain and Global Value Chain.11 The chains 
are meso-level concepts, above the micro-scale of the individual but below that of the 
macro-economy as a whole (Johnston et. al., 2000). Yet the medicines supply chain is 
highly variable, and positioned within a multi-scalar network of flows of material 
goods, power and knowledge. The chains ignore the multiple trajectories that exist 
within the medicines delivery system by over simplifying processes into linear flows. 
A linear model, therefore, proves problematic and hides the complexities that 
characterise the pharmaceutical delivery system 
 Approaching the delivery of medicines from a Global Production Network 
perspective captures the relational structures that characterise the system. The 
approach has its roots in the political economy, considering flows of both material and 
non-material goods across different organizational and geographic scales (Dicken, 
2003, 2002). Using networks as a methodological and analytical tool enables the 
theorisation of a multi-scale institutional framework (Birch, 2007). Using the 
principles found in Global Production Network Theory it is possible to plot the 
activities, flows and relational structures that constitute the global medicines delivery 
system (Figure 2.4). 
The drug supply chain is highly variable. Medicines can be procured through 
various mechanisms. Consequently, it is important to recognise that in order to bring 
down prices it is not sufficient to only target the pharmaceutical manufacturers. The 
drive to expand access to medicines must be placed within the context of a response 
to comprehensive healthcare systems development. Large numbers of health systems 
in the developing world are grossly under resourced. Activists, the state and the media 
often ignore the costs incurred and barriers faced further down the production network 
in favour of concentrating pressure on the multinational pharmaceutical industry. This 
strategy, however, could prove to be damaging to medicines access if it excludes the 
other factors in the equation. 
 
                                                 
11 For an exhaustive account of these approaches see Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994), Johnston et. al. 
(2000) and  Johnston et. al. (2002). 
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Figure 2.4 The Global Pharmaceutical Production Network. (Source: author 
compilation) 
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Pharmaceuticals as knowledge resources 
 
 Pharmaceuticals are knowledge resources. Their value lies in the scientific 
know-how required to produce them. (Lorenzen, 2005; Ernst & Kim, 2002).  The 
entire structures of the pharmaceutical delivery system and the regulatory 
environment surrounding it are based on the assumption that technological know-how 
has a distinct geographical pattern, residing exclusively in the West.  
Knowledge is a strategic resource. In the last thirty years developed countries 
have lost comparative advantage in manufacturing to emerging nations. In response to 
this, developed states have concentrated their efforts on promoting knowledge-driven 
economies, based on high value added activities such as R&D (Birch, 2007). In the 
new geopolitical landscape knowledge is power. Consequently, states and 
corporations do their best to protect it in the form of intellectual property rights.  
Knowledge is dynamic, moved by a variety of market forces. As such 
innovation and techno-scientific change is constituted by space, place and scale 
(Birch, 2007; Prusak & Cohen, 1998). Initially the social sciences were slow to tackle 
ideas about the knowledge economy and post-industrial society (Birch, 2007; Brint, 
2001). In more recent times, however, Geographers have embraced processes of 
knowledge production and distribution. 
On the occasions that knowledge resources have been considered by 
Geographers, emphasis has fallen on the extent to which knowledge industries cluster 
spatially (Gertler & Levite, 2005).  Geographers have considered regional 
concentrations of innovation around pools of talent. They question why certain 
metropolitan areas become hubs of the ‘new economy’ (Coenen et. al., 2004; Birch, 
2007; Chiaroni & Chiesa, 2005; Bathelt et. al., 2004). Occasionally geographers reach 
beyond the local clusters of activity and examine the inter-regional and international 
connections within the knowledge economy, as well as the contribution of the 
knowledge-based sector to national development (Gertler & Levite, 2005; Cooke, 
2006; Coriat et. al., 2003). 12 Geographers have yet to scrutinise the knowledge-based 
industries in terms of the accessibility of their products outside of the advanced 
economies. This study, relating to South Africa, attempts to break the mould, by 
                                                 
12 For an excellent summary of geographical approaches to analysis of the knowledge economy, with 
particular focus on the biotechnology industry, see Birch (2007). 
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examining the use of and demand for a knowledge product rather than the enabling 
factors of its production. 
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Chapter Three: The Global Pharmaceutical Political 
Economy 
  
The medicines delivery system is complex in terms of its scale, flows and the agents 
involved. The pharmaceutical industry is a global network largely underpinned by one 
force – intellectual property. The international intellectual property regime prescribed 
by the World Trade Organization is crucial to the pharmaceutical industry’s business 
model and it’s delivery of innovative medicines. The role of intellectual property is 
not without its critics, however, and dominates many debates over pharmaceutical 
security. The following section offers a brief introduction to the pharmaceutical 
industry and the structure of the medicines delivery system.  
 
 
Profiting from pills: the multinational pharmaceutical industry 
 
For many the pharmaceutical industry exhibits the characteristics of a multinational 
oligopolistic industry. It is associated with barriers to entry and a lack of competition 
leading to high prices, high profits and sub-optimal delivery of products to patients 
(McIntyre, 1999).  Taking a new product through the various national regulatory 
systems is a lengthy and costly process. Only the large multinational pharmaceutical 
companies have the necessary resources to operate throughout the innovation cycle. 
Small and medium sized enterprises face entry barriers, leaving the multinationals in 
an almost unassailable position.  Consequently, ‘Big Pharma’ drives the global 
research and development (R&D) agenda as well as controlling the vast majority of 
the manufacturing and production capabilities. 
 The pharmaceutical industry can be divided into four distinct sectors: non-
prescription, pirate, generic, and research-based (Bale, 1998). The research-based 
pharmaceutical industry is the primary focus of this study. Multinational companies, 
which are able to invest vast amounts of money in innovation, dominate this sector, 
but some research also stems from small biotechnology companies as well as from 
universities and public laboratories. Generic manufacturers produce and sell products 
that are unbranded or branded products that are ‘off patent’. Generic companies are 
reliant upon the R&D conducted by the research-based pharmaceutical companies, 
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but because they only have to cover their manufacturing costs they can market 
products at lower prices than their brand name equivalents.  
Monopoly pricing is a serious concern. As drugs are often a necessity, a 
patient’s demand for a product is almost perfectly price inelastic: a price increase will 
not chase many customers out of the market, conversely a price decrease will not 
attract more customers into the market (McIntyre, 1999).  Pharmaceutical products 
are disease specific, so the pharmaceutical market consists of a large number of 
therapeutic sub-markets. Companies often choose to specialise in a particular 
therapeutic area and dominate that sub-market. This seemingly monopolistic structure 
troubles a number of commentators who believe that it leads to inflated prices in the 
face of almost total market exclusivity. These critics often ignore the fact that as a 
product matures commercially, new and improved substitutes enter the market and 
there is a shift towards perfect competition. In reality it is very unlikely that a product 
will have exclusivity for more than one or two years. 
It is a common belief that there is no price competition in the pharmaceutical 
industry. In recent years, however, there has been recognition that price competition is 
growing due to increased generic availability and the growth of biotechnology. For 
example, the largest pharmaceutical company, Pfizer, has only a 9% global market 
share; this compares favourably to other industries such as electronics and software 
whose markets exhibit higher concentrations of power (McIntyre, 1999; Deloitte 
Consulting 2007). In light of the recent opening up of the pharmaceutical market the 
industry is emerging as a dynamic oligopoly with substantial competition. 
When reading some of the literature produced by the media, civil society and 
even some academics, one could be forgiven for thinking that multinational 
pharmaceutical companies are responsible for the HIV/AIDS crisis, that they created 
tuberculosis or were deliberately spreading malaria. A number of commentators label 
the pharmaceutical industry, along with the arms industry and tobacco manufacturers, 
as ‘killers’ (Werner et. al., 1997; Reekie, 2000). These comments are ill considered 
and do little but damage constructive debates about medicine delivery.  Multinational 
companies are highly visible targets, and campaigns against big industry mobilize 
significant support for non-governmental organizations. To compare the production of 
medicines to the manufacture of arms and cigarettes is an irresponsible exercise in 
finger pointing. 
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While many people regard pharmaceutical companies as villains, the reality is 
that global health would be a lot worse off without them (Resnik, 2001). A great deal 
of research, development and manufacturing would not be done without investment 
from the industry. At the beginning of the twentieth century Aspirin was the only 
widely available modern medicine (Resnik, 2001). A century later, previously deadly 
illnesses are treatable within days. In many ways the pharmaceutical industry is a 
victim of its own success. Society expects the development pipeline never to run dry. 
It expects newer and better medicines to appear constantly, and for them to be 
available cheaply so that everyone can access them. 
No reliable publicly financed method has been found to match the sums the 
pharmaceutical industry invests for the significant number of diseases and conditions 
that are treated in modern medicine. Governments typically do not think that far ahead 
and academic institutions channel their resources to experimental science and do not 
have the resources or the industrial development expertise (Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 2007).13 No public sector system could develop or sustain 
the scientific talent required to develop new medicines. In the face of few viable 
alternatives, there is little option but for academics, governments, global institutions 
and non-governmental organisations to engage constructively with the pharmaceutical 
industry on issues of medicine inequity. 
The industry has never denied that it is motivated by profit. The caveat is that 
there is no contradiction between profit-seeking behaviour and delivering medications 
that satisfy healthcare needs (Resnik, 2001; Lexchin, 2006). The problem lies in the 
fact that there is not an equitable distribution of satisfied healthcare needs. Profits are 
greater in the developed world markets, therefore research and development is centred 
upon those markets. The balance between the return for industry and the return for 
society is a contentious one.14 One pharmaceutical executive puts the matter as 
follows: 
                                                 
13 Sixty minute face-to-face interview with Mr M Worrall, Public Affairs Executive at the Association 
of the British Pharmaceutical Industry. June 2006. Transcription checked by interviewee and retained 
by author. For more information see Appendix B. 
 
14 The industry attempts to pacify criticism and increase its contribution to society through Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR). The pharmaceutical industry does more than most industries in terms of 
CSR. It trains health personnel, donates medicines, conducts delivery programmes with partner 
organisations, and performs research into neglected diseases with the help of organisations such as the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. In 2005 the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) conducted a Health Partnership Survey to measure the 
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 We have people who put money in AstraZeneca…if they 
 are pension funds to provide their investors with pensions. 
 Whatever they are investing in us, they are investing in a 
 for-profit model. If we were not making a profit we would  
 be doing a disservice to them, to ourselves, and to patients.15 
 
The pharmaceutical industry’s modus operandi is to provide its shareholders 
with a return on their investment. Above all else, the pharmaceutical industry strives 
to protect its business model. The methods that it uses to do this are often heavy-
handed and ungainly, and consequently attract criticism from many quarters. Within 
the international political economy approach, the power of multinationals is often 
analysed. One view is that multinational firms are the primary “movers and shapers” 
of the global economy and as such wield almost unparalleled influence over states and 
supranational institutions (Dicken, 2003, 2002). The relationship between states and 
corporations can be simultaneously cooperative and competing, supportive and 
conflictual.  
The main connections between countries have become the internal markets of 
multinational companies (Figure 3.1). Accordingly, developed states (where the 
multinationals are most often based) look to apply pressure on a country such as 
South Africa in an effort to protect their market. Such power dynamics follow 
Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony in which dominant groups in society attempt 
to impose their ideas about how a society should be run (Gesler et. al., 1997). One of 
the most explicit expressions of this hegemony is found in corporate lobbying 
activity. 
                                                                                                                                            
industry’s total contribution to the Millennium Development Goals. It found that in the period 2000 to 
2005, the industry provided health interventions to help up to 539 million people, to a value of US$ 4.4 
billion (IFPMA 2007). The survey methodology and data were validated by the esteemed London 
School of Economics and Political Science. In 2007 the IFPMA produced a document entitled 
Partnerships to Build Healthier Societies in the Developing World. It gives details of 135 medicines 
delivery and R&D partnerships, as well as smaller activities and emergency relief efforts conducted by 
the pharmaceutical industry. The programmes cover diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis; tropical diseases (sleeping sickness, chagas disease, lymphatic filariasis, leprosy and 
schistosmiasis); vaccine initiatives; child and maternal health interventions; as well as chronic diseases 
such as diabetes, breast cancer, asthma, epilepsy and haemophilia (IFPMA 2007). 
 
15 Ninety minute face-to-face interview with Mr C Major, Head of Public Affairs, AstraZeneca Plc. 
July 2006. Transcription checked by interviewee and retained by author. For more information see 
Appendix B. 
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The corporation’s legally defined mandate is to pressure, 
 relentlessly and without exception its own self interest, 
 regardless of the often harmful consequences it might cause 
 to others (Bakan, 2004, p. 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Countries linked through the ‘internal markets’ of multinational 
firms. (Source: Adapted from Dicken, 2003, p. 243)  
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pharmaceutical executives pushing for stronger intellectual property regimes across 
the world regardless of a country’s level of development (Vaver & Basheer, 2006).16 
Intellectual property lies at the heart of the conflict between the 
pharmaceutical industry, civil society and governments over the provision of 
medicines. Whereas the industry sees intellectual property as integral to the continued 
production of innovative medicines, and therefore beneficial to global health, others 
are convinced that it is one of the biggest barriers to global pharmaceutical security.  
 
The ‘Grand Bargain’: intellectual property and innovation  
 
Intellectual property is the foundation of the pharmaceutical industry’s business 
model. The protection of intellectual property is seen as the single most important 
factor when deciding what therapeutic area to invest in and in which countries to 
produce. Simultaneously, the global pharmaceutical intellectual property regime 
provides the focus for the majority of academic, activist and government criticism of 
the industry. Myths and misconceptions about intellectual property laws dominate the 
debate due to its highly complex and legalistic nature. The literature on intellectual 
property is vast and is challenging reading for those from a non-legal background: the 
following section gives no more than an outline of patent law. 
The value of a medicine lies not in the pill a patient takes but in the knowledge 
that lies behind the production of the pill. Initial research and development of a new 
chemical entity is associated with very high fixed costs, but the marginal cost of 
manufacturing each unit is low and almost constant (Cleary, 2001). Knowledge is 
easily copied making it difficult for the inventor to protect it. In the absence of legal 
protection a firm would have little choice but to hide its discoveries from competitors 
and thus deny society the benefits of scientific advances. Ensuring disclosure of 
scientific breakthroughs, whilst still guaranteeing a return on the knowledge maker’s 
investment is seen as the optimal model for encouraging innovation. In a conventional 
free market system without intellectual property protection, the innovator would bear 
the full cost of its failures but would be unable to profit from its successes because 
                                                 
16 Fifty minute telephone interview with Dr M Kamal-Yanni, Health Policy Adviser, Oxfam 
International, June 2006. Transcription checked by interviewee and retained by author. For more 
information see Appendix B. 
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competitors would be able to ride freely on its efforts (Pogge, 2005). Intellectual 
property laws correct such market failure. 
Research and development costs for a specific drug are hard to obtain. Costs 
are incurred over long periods of time for R&D that does not necessarily lead to the 
planned innovation or a successful product (Williams, 2007). Additionally, R&D 
spending and returns are not completely segregated by medicine; a company’s overall 
R&D effort represents a give and take between several drugs (Cahoy, 2008). Despite 
such difficulties a number of studies have been conducted attempting to establish an 
average figure for the industry’s expenditure on R&D. A recent survey, conducted by 
Tufts University, sets the cost to deliver a single medicine at an average of $1.2 
billion in 2006 (Deloitte Consulting, 2007). Previous studies set the figure slightly 
lower  (DiMasi et. al., 2003; Forman, 2007). Even allowing for overstatement and 
methodological difficulties it is safe to say that R&D costs in the pharmaceutical 
sector are considerable.  
One of the reasons R&D is so costly in the pharmaceutical sector is that most 
new drug candidates fail to reach market (Figure 3.2).17 Pre-clinical and clinical 
testing phases generally take more than a decade to complete. Typically, fewer than 
1% of compounds examined in the pre-clinical period make it to human testing, and 
only 22% of the compounds entering clinical trials survive the development process 
and gain regulatory approval from bodies such as the United States’ Food and Drug 
Administration, the FDA (Grabowski, 2002).  
The worth of intellectual property rights is not in a particular idea or 
technology but in the ability of the right holder to prevent the exploitation of that idea 
by a competitor. Such privileges are termed ‘negative rights’, as they give the owner 
not only the right to own or sell ideas but also to regulate the use and exclude others 
(Correa, 2007; Satardien, 2006). Intellectual property rights not only protect but also 
create scarcity of knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Failure can result from toxicity, manufacturing difficulties, inconvenient dosing characteristics, and 
inadequate efficacy (Grabowski, 2002).  
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Figure 3.2.  The risks involved and the time taken in pharmaceutical research and 
development. Note the protracted proportion of patent life that can be spent on drug 
testing and approval – half the patent duration in this example. (Source: adapted from 
Ringer, 2007, slide 8). 
  
With rights, however, come obligations. Intellectual property rights bind 
knowledge makers into a social contract with society, a “Grand Bargain” (Koski, 
2005, p. 393). The intention is to create a system that is mutually beneficial for 
producers and users, conducive to social and economic welfare. The pharmaceutical 
industry is guaranteed profits in return for it producing new medicines that benefit 
society.   
Neoliberal economic philosophy holds that property rights are fundamental to 
a functioning market system, establishing a direct link between effort and reward, thus 
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stimulating innovation.18 The structuralist perspective, however, links intellectual 
property rights with dependency theory, holding the view that they increase the 
dependence of the world periphery on the core (Balaam & Veseth, 2001). Many 
developing country governments as well as civil society organisations subscribe to the 
structuralist view, believing that intellectual property is a component of a policy of 
technological protectionism intended at consolidating an international division of 
labour (Lanoszka, 2003).  
The protection of intellectual property has in recent years moved from a 
defensive to an offensive corporate strategy. Patents have become corporate assets, 
reflecting a company’s market competitiveness (United Nations, 2007; United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2001). This is particularly true in the 
pharmaceutical industry, where shareholder value is directly linked to the depth and 
strength of a firm’s product pipeline.  
A central pillar of the new International Political Economy is a global 
intellectual property regime. The WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement is the specific legislative expression of 
intellectual property law to which all Member states must conform.
                                                 
18 For a country such as South Africa a strong domestic intellectual property regime is seen as a 
necessary condition for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and technology transfer. Protection of a 
multinational firm’s intellectual property is an important precondition for investors in any country. For 
industrialised countries, assuring intellectual property is particularly important because their 
competitive edge lies in research and development in high technology fields (Cleary, 2001). 
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Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS)19 
  
  The TRIPS Agreement is the embodiment of the tension  
  between the right to life and essential medicines on the one  
  hand and profit maximization and incentives for drug  
  discovery by pharmaceutical corporations on the other   
  (Aginam, 2007, p. 150). 
 
 The WTO’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) firmly occupies the ground between the right to health and the right to 
wealth. Arguably no piece of global trade legislation influences the welfare of a 
nation’s population in the same way as TRIPS. The Agreement exemplifies the 
structuralist paradigm of an individual’s health being intimately situated within the 
international political economy.20 
 As a consequence of its significance for medicines delivery, TRIPS has 
become the focus for global pharmaceutical activism. Intellectual property was 
previously an abstract issue left to academics, lawyers and economists. Since the 
signing of TRIPS, however, engagement with intellectual property has increased 
exponentially. Non-governmental organisations, such as Médicins sans Frontiéres and 
Oxfam, have run popular campaigns centred on pharmaceutical patents, and coverage 
regularly appears in the mass media detailing progress within intellectual property.  
The matter of intellectual property in relation to affordable medicines has dogged the 
                                                 
19 This section only attempts to give an outline of the most pertinent aspects of TRIPS in terms of 
pharmaceutical security. The following texts provide more detailed accounts of the legislation: 
Satardien (2006) gives a clear and concise account of TRIPS and the 30th August Decision. Cleary 
(2001) looks at TRIPS from an economist’s view and also deals with its specific impacts on South 
Africa. Drahos and Braithwaite (2002) provide an exhaustive description of TRIPS whilst looking at 
the pharmaceutical industry’s engagement with the legislation. James Love (2001a) offers procedural 
details and opportunities for governments to exploit within the global intellectual property regime. 
Cohen et. al. (2006) help position TRIPS within the wider debates over access to medicines. Cahoy 
(2008) produces one of the most digestible texts on the subject, and deliberately distances himself from 
some of the more legalistic approaches. For the most comprehensive explanation, Carlos Correa (2007) 
has produced an account detailing all the aspects of TRIPS and its impact on access to medicines. 
 
20 Upon scrutiny there are potential links between human rights and the TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS 
recognizes the balance between rights and obligations of technology holders whilst holding the wider 
objective of promoting social and economic welfare – however, this is not the same as saying that 
TRIPS takes a human rights approach (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2001). 
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WTO since its inception (McBeth, 2006) and it does not appear as if it is likely to go 
away in the immediate future.  
The TRIPS Agreement is one of twenty-eight accords that make up the Final 
Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations that began in 1986 
(Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002), ending in the formation of the WTO, the institution 
that embodies the neo-liberal economic dogma dominating the current international 
political economy. TRIPS is one of the WTO’s founding Agreements and, as such, 
intellectual property occupies a central position within the organization. 
The TRIPS Agreement was tied into the whole WTO package. Accordingly 
acceptance of TRIPS can be seen as a quid pro quo where by developing countries 
were offered benefits such as reductions in agricultural subsidies (Drahos & 
Baithwaite, 2002; Cleary, 2001). The reality is that most developing countries had 
little choice but to sign. The choice was all or nothing - sign all twenty-eight 
agreements or be excluded from the WTO. Consequently the developing countries’ 
bargaining position was weak. A country such as South Africa – in the process of 
emerging from apartheid and the economic isolation that was associated with it – had 
barely begun to find its feet in the post-Cold War international political economy.   
The terms of TRIPS and many of the other twenty-eight WTO Agreements 
were virtually dictated by the wealthy nations. The room for policy manoeuvre is 
narrow, and neo-liberal free market doctrine dominates  (Loeppky, 2004). In this age 
of ‘transparency’, ‘democracy’ and the ‘participatory ethic’, African countries were 
not present during much of the Critical Uruguay Round of negotiations. Indeed,  
 
It is doubtful if, before signing the document, and signing  
away the fates of their countries many African governments  
were able to find time even to read the document, let alone  
analyse the implications…for their countries…Countries such  
as the US, Britain and France insist on democracy and  
transparency in Africa. But the international organisations on  
which they sit and take decisions – such as…the WTO – are  
the most undemocratic, non-transparent and authoritarian  
institutions of global governance. (Tandon, 1999, p. 84)    
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 In recent years there has been recognition of the exceptional nature of the 
TRIPS Agreement in terms of its potential influence on global health. The WTO, the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the WHO have established 
consultative mechanisms that are intended to increase participation, such as the 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual 
Property (IGWG). The need for a more democratic structure became essential as the 
gravity of the HIV/AIDS pandemic became apparent. The most explicit recognition of 
the TRIPS Agreement’s responsibility towards health was made on the 14th November 
2001 at the WTO’s Ministerial Conference, meeting in Doha, Qatar. Signatories 
conceded that, 
 
   the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent  
members from taking direct measures to protect public  
health. Accordingly…we affirm that the Agreement can  
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner  
supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health  
and in particular, to promote medicines for all (Vawda,  
2003, p. 680). 
 
The Doha Declaration was a historic moment for public health and for those 
fighting for equitable access to medicines. The Declaration was official recognition 
that economic policies can potentially have health impacts and that health takes 
priority over intellectual property rights.21 The Doha Declaration can be interpreted as 
acknowledgment that domestic action is not sufficient to ensure a populations health 
(Drager & Sunderland, 2007). It lends further weight to the structuralist assertion of 
health being intimately tied to the international political economy via the ‘body 
politic’.  
 The TRIPS Agreement globalises the set of intellectual property principles it 
contains. Prior to TRIPS, states were free to decide what level of protection they 
would give to cover whatever forms of technology they believed were important for 
their development needs. Measures to protect pharmaceuticals could be taken where 
                                                 
21 Japan, Canada, the United States, Switzerland and Australia all opposed the Declaration on 
intellectual property, due in part, to lobbying activities from the pharmaceutical industry (Vawda, 
2003). 
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national development, technological and health requirements suggested such action 
was beneficial (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2001; Drahos & 
Braithwaite, 2002). TRIPS has greatly eroded the degree of autonomy a state holds 
over its domestic intellectual property regime. 
 A principle of non-discrimination sits at the core of the WTO, according to 
which any trade barrier is applied equally to all members independent of their level of 
development (Correa, 2007, 2001; Senona, 2005). The TRIPS Agreement can be seen 
as an expression of global hegemony. The knowledge producing core countries 
exerted their geo-economic supremacy over peripheral nations in order to shape flows 
of wealth in the international political economy. 
 The Agreement exemplifies the classic one-size-fits-all policy. The principles 
enshrined within TRIPS are intended to apply in equal measure to DVDs and life-
saving pharmaceuticals.  TRIPS grants a twenty year patent to an invention if it is 
new, involves an innovative step and is capable of industrial application (Mugambe, 
2002).  In practice, however, the holder of a patent does not have twenty full years in 
which to exercise their exclusive right because a significant proportion of the patent 
life is exhausted while the patentee seeks to obtain regulatory approval, see figure 3.2 
(Epstein, 2006). Patents prevent third parties from making, using, selling or importing 
a patented product without the owners consent (Sinha & Condon, 2005), a negative 
right. 
 Evidence indicates that local innovation in the majority of the developing 
world is not supported by a strong intellectual property regime (Correa, 2007). A 
country can only take advantage of patent protection if it has money to invest and the 
capacity to develop scientific knowledge. A country such as South Africa finds it hard 
to attract research and development investment, not because it has weak intellectual 
property (South Africa has very strong intellectual property provision relative to other 
middle-income countries), but because of other factors such as a weak chemical 
industry and a limited number of suitably skilled workers. Intellectual property is not 
the all-or-nothing solution it is held to be by its most vocal supporters. Other elements 
of industrial and workforce development are also important. 
 Whilst TRIPS is binding for all WTO Members, the Agreement recognises the 
difficulty of implementing such a strong regime for low-income countries. As such it 
set different deadlines for implementation dependent on a Member’s stage of 
development. Developed countries had until 1996 to comply, most developing 
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countries had until 2000, with some allowed an extension to 2005, while there are at 
least 30 Least Developed Countries that have until 2016 to pass the legislation 
(Foreman, 2002; Abbott & Reichman, 2007). Such variations in implementation 
complicate analyses of the Agreement. What is clear, however, is that with the 
passage of time more and more medicines will be on patent in a greater number of 
countries. Consequently, concerns over intellectual property and pharmaceutical 
security are unlikely to deteriorate. 
 
TRIPS flexibilities: recognition of health needs 
 
Enshrined within the original TRIPS Agreement are a limited number of flexibilities 
that governments can use in order to ensure a patent is not abused and that welfare-
damaging practices are kept to a minimum. TRIPS allows countries to create in their 
domestic patent law systems for permitting production or import of generic products 
as long as they adhere to the minimum standards established by the Agreement 
(Cleary, 2001; Love, 2001).  However, there is a difference between what TRIPS 
allows and what countries actually do. Considering the extent of pharmaceutical 
inequity surprisingly few countries have taken advantage of the permitted flexibilities. 
TRIPS is a complicated and fairly ambiguous document,22 accordingly countries may 
not feel confident in exercising the rights they have. This situation is exacerbated by 
external pressure from other states (see Box 3.1).   
 The most controversial and widely publicised flexibility within TRIPS is the 
compulsory license. Compulsory licenses are nothing new, they have been part of 
patent law for years. Canada regularly issued compulsory licenses from 1969 until the 
late 1980s (Love, 2001). One result was that in 1982 the prices of licensed drugs were 
47% lower than in the United States of America (Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, 2002). There is a need in certain therapeutic areas to switch from a low 
volume - high margin approach to a high volume - low margin approach, to ensure 
sustainable supplies (Abbott & Reichman, 2007). A compulsory license is a 
mechanism that, by allowing the generic production of a specific drug, can shift 
production to the high volume model. Article 31 of TRIPS states that 
                                                 
22 Forty-minute telephone interview with Ms V Ehrich, Chief Operating Officer of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry Association of South Africa (PIASA). 5th May 2008. Transcription checked by interviewee 
and retained by author. For more information see Appendix B. 
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  A government may issue a compulsory license authorizing  
  the government or a third party to produce generic drugs  
  without the authorization of the patent holder when  
  negotiations fail to obtain authorization on reasonable  
  commercial terms (WTO, 1994; Article 31). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3.1: Demanding a higher standard: Section 301 and TRIPS plus 
 
The United States government disapproves of the TRIPS flexibilities. The 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) produces an annual Section 301 
Report listing those countries, which it believes are threatening the economic 
interests of the United States (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002). An unfavourable 
finding in the Section 301 Report can lead to the withdrawal of trade benefits or 
the imposition of duties on a country’s goods. Countries named in reports issued 
by the pharmaceutical industry are often remarkably similar to those found in the 
final Section 301 Report.  
Thailand was elevated to the priority watch list in 2007 after it issued 
compulsory licenses on three pharmaceutical products (Rimmington & Weissman, 
2008).  The Thai private sector is understandably afraid of losing tariff privileges 
from the United States if compulsory licenses are issued. About 20% of Thai 
exports to the United States, worth about US$4 billion are under the United States’ 
low tariff generalised system of preferences programme. On the other hand the 
government committee looking into compulsory licensing stated that Thailand 
would save up to US$250 million (R1.9 billion) over five years by using generic 
drugs. The potential economic losses are greater than the money saved by 
purchasing generics (The Nation, 2008). The threat of economic sanctions forces 
governments to put a monetary value on an individual’s life.  
After Doha, the US and the European Union entered into a series of Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) with developing countries that imposed intellectual 
property requirements beyond those demanded in TRIPS, limiting exclusions from 
or exceptions to patents, these measures have been called ‘TRIPS plus’ provisions. 
The United States has concluded FTA negotiations with Chile, Singapore, 
Morocco, Panama, Peru and South Korea, all the agreements include ‘TRIPS plus’ 
provisions (Lee, 2007). Peru assessed the potential impact of an FTA with the US 
and found that the agreement would exclude approximately 800,000 people from 
having access to medicines (Cohen et. al., 2006). Until recently SACU 
(representing South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) were in 
negotiations with the US, but the negotiations deadlocked.   
The flexibilities within TRIPS are intended to ensure that exclusive 
ownership of knowledge does not become detrimental to a population’s welfare. 
Whether TRIPS will permit developing countries to take advantage of its 
flexibilities will depend on the willingness of individual nations to resist political 
pressure from the developed world. 
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Before a compulsory license is granted, the proposed user must try 
unsuccessfully for a reasonable amount of time to secure a license on realistic terms.  
This requirement is, however, subject to a waiver if there is a ‘national emergency’ or 
a ‘circumstance of extreme urgency’ (Chien, 2003; WTO, 1994). Unfortunately the 
TRIPS Agreement does not define what constitutes a reasonable amount of time, 
realistic terms, extreme urgency or an emergency. Hence disagreements emerge and 
uncertainty prevails. 
 The economic foundation of intellectual property means that an incursion on a 
patent can be measured in terms of monetary loss. As the loss can be given a value it 
is possible to compensate a patent owner for the reduction of their rights (Cahoy, 
2008). The TRIPS Agreement states that the patent holder must be offered a royalty 
fee when a compulsory license is issued. There is no standard figure for the royalty 
fee and the level of remuneration is left to national policy, a condition that leads to 
further uncertainty. 
Before the 1st January 2005, a WTO member nation had the option of issuing a 
compulsory license and importing from the big generic medicines producing countries 
such as India and Brazil. After India and Brazil became TRIPS compliant they could 
no longer produce and export cheap generic versions of patented medicines (Correa, 
2007). If a country were to issue a compulsory license it would have to have sufficient 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity to produce its own generic versions. More 
than 90% of the developing country members of the WTO lack a functional 
pharmaceutical sector, the threat of a compulsory license is hollow without one 
(Tandon, 1999). This concern was raised by a number of middle and low-income 
countries at the WTO, and in 2001 at the WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Doha, the 
TRIPS Council was directed by the Members to develop an “expeditious” solution to 
the compulsory license challenge (Bourgeois & Burns, 2002). 
On the 30th August 2003 a solution was announced. The agreement allowed 
any member country to export pharmaceutical products under compulsory license to a 
country facing a health emergency (Haffejee, 2003; McBeth, 2006).23 Supporters of 
                                                 
23 On the 6th December 2005, WTO Members made the August 2003 Decision permanent (Lee, 2007) 
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the Decision hailed it as proof that the trading system could take into account 
humanitarian and development concerns.24 
The TRIPS Agreement does allow countries room to manoeuvre in a way that 
can enhance access to medicines. If used correctly and to its full potential, TRIPS 
could form part of the solution to increasing equitable access to medicines. However, 
the Agreement remains largely unworkable due to its ambiguity. TRIPS lacks both a 
floor and a ceiling (Cahoy, 2008). There are few limitations on which countries can 
‘break’ patents in order to control costs or the conditions that are necessary in order 
for a country to do so. Additionally, the flexibilities that do exist are overly complex 
and cumbersome, immediately excluding the nations that need to use them the most. 
 
The significance of patents for pharmaceutical security 
 
The debate concerning intellectual property in relation to pharmaceutical products has 
become greatly polarised. Disputes are dominated by two extremist views. On the one 
hand there are references in some media, civil society and academic material to 
patents killing and to the HIV/AIDS crisis being a “western legal holocaust” (Mannan 
& Story, 2006; Basheer, 2007). On the other hand, there are the one-sided views that 
extol the wonders of the patent system. Such views promise a country such as Eritrea 
rapid innovation and industrial success if it only introduced an intellectual property 
regime on a par with the United States (Basheer, 2007). Informed examination is 
necessary for a subject as complex and multi-faceted as pharmaceutical patent law. As 
with any matter, extremism is unhelpful for furthering dialogue and can ultimately be 
dangerous. A middle path is required. 
 The belief that patents have little or no influence on access to medicines is 
based on the argument that patents are the least significant factor influencing the 
                                                 
24 Although the 2003 Decision expanded the scope of flexibilities the numerous conditions (including 
pre-shipment and labelling requirements to prevent re-exportation) continue to raise questions about its 
utility. Only Canada and Norway have effected legislative changes in their patent laws to accommodate 
the August 30th Decision (Aginam, 2007; Elliot, 2006). The Decision was finally put to the test by 
Rwanda when it officially notified the TRIPS Council, on the 17th July 2007, that it intended to import 
260,000 packs of fixed-dose triple combination HIV therapy TriAvir from Apotex Inc., a Canadian 
firm (The South Centre, 2007) Whilst the process is ongoing serious misgivings about the system have 
been voiced. Apotex has stated that it would not consider entering the Canadian programme again 
unless the process was simplified (Gandhi, 2008), whilst MSF who were a driving force behind the 
Rwandan application, believe that the process is prohibitively complex (Médicins sans Frontiéres, 
2006). 
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availability of medicines. The argument follows that whilst prices, largely dictated by 
the market exclusivity afforded by patents, can clearly be a barrier to access, other 
elements, such as healthcare infrastructure and R&D capacity for neglected diseases, 
play a more significant role (Bourgeois & Burns, 2002).  Those who deny that patents 
increase pharmaceutical inequity regularly cite one study from a suite of several 
analysing the incidence of patents filed for pharmaceutical products in the developing 
world, particularly Africa (Attaran, 2004; Attaran & Gillespie-White, 2001). A 2004 
study found that patenting is rare. In 65 low and middle-income countries, where 4 
billion people live, only 17 products out of 319 on the essential drugs list were 
patented.25 The overall patent incidence of 1.4% was concentrated mainly in the larger 
markets. The typical developing country is likely to have many fewer essential 
medicines under patent or pending application than the 17 it could theoretically have, 
as pharmaceutical companies usually do not seek patents in developing countries. Of 
the cases where companies could have obtained patents for essential medicines, they 
did so only 31% of the time (Attaran, 2004).  
 Evidently, patents are not barriers to access in the majority of cases. Patents do 
not explain why effective and safe drugs that have been in the public domain for years 
do not reach the millions in poor countries who need them, thus lending weight to the 
argument that other factors such as infrastructure have a greater influence on access 
(Bourgeois & Burns, 2002). The frequency of patenting in a country is largely 
explained by market size.  Statistical analysis demonstrates that the patent laws were 
used more frequently in developing countries with large populations, high per capita 
incomes, or high levels of income inequality (Attaran, 2004). South Africa is a 
significant anomaly in the incidence of medicine patenting. 
 In addition to being the country with the largest number of HIV positive 
people worldwide, South Africa is also the wealthiest African country and is best 
                                                 
25 The WHO produces a new Essential Drugs List every two years. Essential medicines are the 
foundation for nearly all public health programmes (Pecoul et. al., 1999). The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) defines essential medicines as, “…those that satisfy the priority health care needs 
of the population. They are selected with due regard to public health relevance…Essential medicines 
are intended to be available within the context of functioning health systems at all times in adequate 
amounts…at a price the individual and the community can afford”(WHO, 2008b). The concept of 
essential medicines was a major breakthrough in the history of medicine, pharmacy and public health. 
The Essential Drugs Lists have two main functions. First, they have a practical function helping health 
departments choose the appropriate treatment in an overcrowded pharmaceutical market. Second, drugs 
on the Essential Medicines List have a symbolic function. Their essential nature gives them an 
exceptional status (Chirac, 2003). If a drug is named on the Essential Drugs List it indicates that a 
country’s health system cannot function satisfactorily without it. 
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equipped to produce and supply generic drugs to its neighbours (Selgelid & Sepers, 
2006). Pharmaceutical production is a global system, in which forces of demand and 
the capacity to manufacture transgress territorial boundaries. If other countries have 
the ability to manufacture, such as India or Brazil, the ramifications of imposing 
patents in those countries go far beyond their borders. Patents have a wider 
geographical significance than can immediately be appreciated from a quantitative 
study of patent incidence. Pharmaceutical companies own all the key patents in all the 
markets where they perceive the threats of competition from generic manufacturers 
(Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002).26 As a Geographer it is important to recognise the geo-
strategic nature of patents. 
 Another exception found in the Attaran study of medicines patenting is 
HIV/AIDS treatments. It found that in South Africa, in 2004, thirteen out of fifteen 
anti-retroviral treatments were patented.  Considering the extent of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Africa, this is a significant anomaly. As ARVs are relatively new drugs 
the majority of the products are still subject to patent - most of the medicines on the 
Essential Drugs List are older products that are off patent. Patents are particularly 
significant for HIV/AIDS because the most effective form of treatment is made up of 
a combination of medicines. Consequently if one of the medicines that constitute a 
Triple-Combination Therapy is under patent it threatens accessibility to the whole 
treatment (Selgelid & Sepers, 2006; Attaran, 2004; Foreman, 2002).  
Limiting the Attaran study to the WHO’s Essential Drugs List is also 
problematic. Almost 99% of medicines on the list are off patent, yet up to 50% of 
people in Africa have no access to these medicines. One needs to, however, ask why 
most of these products are off patent? In order for a medicine to be included on the 
list it must be affordable. A balance must be struck between efficacy and financial 
realism. Accordingly, once a new drug is patented (and is therefore more expensive), 
the WHO will recommend an older, often, less effective generic medicine in that 
therapeutic area. Patents, therefore, act as an exclusion criterion (Chirac, 2003). The 
Essential Drug List would look very different if it was purely judged on therapeutic 
need. Although many of the older medicines that are off patent and on the list are very 
                                                 
26 Forty-minute telephone interview with Mr J Berger, senior researcher and Head of Policy, Research 
and Communications, the AIDS Law Project. 20th May 2008. Transcription checked by interviewee 
and retained by author. For more information see Appendix B. 
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effective, the risk is that the list becomes merely a directory of old, second rate 
medicines.  
 Despite the criticism attached to intellectual property, some form of protection 
is necessary in order to ensure continued development of medicines. Without a well-
structured system of patent protection, neither the research nor the generic 
pharmaceutical industry would be able to grow and prosper as the rate of new product 
introductions and patent expirations would decline significantly (Grabowski, 2002).27 
In many therapeutic areas the strong exclusive rights that encourage innovation also 
defeat efficient dissemination of the product (Epstein, 2006). The holy grail of patent 
policy is to obtain the ideal incentives for both initial innovation and post innovation 
distribution. 
 The easiest way to reduce prices is to introduce competition, most commonly 
from generic suppliers. Whilst there are alternatives that exist, TRIPS already has 
provisions that allow for this (such as compulsory licensing). The UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health stated recently that pharmaceutical companies 
“should respect the right of countries to use, to the full, the provisions in the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”(Hunt, 2007; p. 
3). Pharmaceutical companies and developed states must allow the most vulnerable 
members of the global community to take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities without 
the threat of sanctions or legal action. The vast majority of legal and moral cultures 
respect private property. If someone takes property without permission, they are 
called a thief. Moral norms cover similar ground, but an exception might be made for 
a starving child taking a loaf of bread from a wealthy family – the need is great and 
the loss is small, so perhaps it is morally justified (Outterson, 2006). The same could 
be said for pharmaceuticals: the medical need is great and the impact of a compulsory 
license is small. 
 The pharmaceutical industry claim that the price of a drug reflects, among 
other things, the cost of R&D. Intellectual property ensures that, for a certain period 
of time, a branded pharmaceutical product is not undercut by a rival generic 
equivalent. Critics of the industry, however, claim that prices simply reflect what the 
market will bear. Thus, for example, when Pentamidine a cheap treatment developed 
                                                 
27 Forty-five minute telephone interview with Mrs V Beaumont, Executive Director of Innovative 
Medicines South Africa, 5th May 2008. Transcription checked by interviewee and retained by author. 
For more information see Appendix B. 
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for sleeping sickness was found to be effective in treating AIDS related pneumonia 
the price increased by 500% and it evaporated from the market in poor African and 
South-East Asian countries (Cooper et. al., 2007b). No additional research had been 
done, however the market demand exploded as its new use was discovered. The 
following section details the influence of market forces on pharmaceutical inequity. 
 
The market rules: pay or die  
   
  The poor have no consumer power, so the market has failed  
them. I’m tired of the logic that says: ‘He who can’t pay dies’. 
Dr James Oribinski, President of MSF, 2000 (quoted in Vachani  
& Smith, 2004, p. 117) 
 
The patent system works in developing world markets where profits are 
guaranteed to be high. In such markets price is less of a barrier. Public health systems 
have considerable budgets for pharmaceutical spending and private patients have 
substantial purchasing power. The market is almost perfectly price inelastic. 
Over 86% of the global drug market lies in North America, Europe and Japan. 
Africa accounts for between 1% and 2% of the global market; South Africa 
constitutes approximately 0.3% (Sprague & Woolman, 2006; Forman, 2007). Public 
spending on drugs is around $239 (R1840) per head per annum in OECD countries. 
By contrast many developing countries spend less than $20 (R154) per head per 
annum on all health programmes, and less than $10 (R77) per head per annum in 
some sub-Saharan Africa states (Trouiller et. al., 2002).  It is self-evident where a 
company driven by shareholder value is going to concentrate its research. 
There is a well-known problem about public goods in economic theory: 
market mechanisms are not good at generating them because individuals find it hard 
to make a profit from their production (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002). The problem is 
return on investment. Multinational pharmaceutical companies are largely unwilling 
to pursue a line of research unless the potential outcome is a product with annual sales 
of approximately $1 billion (Grabowski, 2002; Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, 2002). Whilst this model is regrettable, pharmaceutical companies are not 
charities; however socially desirable it may be, one cannot ask them to forgo their 
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profits. No amount of intellectual property protection is going to make poor 
individuals in Africa a lucrative target for the pharmaceutical industry. 
Intellectual property rights alone do not meet the need for the development of 
new products to fight diseases where the potential paying market is small or uncertain 
(WHO Intergovernmental Working Group, 2008). Patents guarantee a certain length 
of market exclusivity, however if few individuals in that market can pay in the first 
place, this period of exclusivity is worthless. Arguments that revolve around patents 
are insignificant in the case of diseases that exclusively affect the very poorest 
individuals. The value of a patent is determined as much, and perhaps more, by the 
size and profitability of the patient market than the novelty of a patent holder’s 
invention (Love, 2004). Other incentives must be found.28  
Many therapeutic areas are being neglected because the patients are poor. 
‘Treatments’ for premature baldness, social shyness and erectile dysfunction garner 
significantly more R&D investment than medicines for many infectious diseases.  The 
‘10/90 gap’ is a phrase often used to describe the situation. It illustrates the current 
global R&D distortion, in which only 10% of R&D spending is directed at the health 
problems that cause 90% of the global disease burden (t'Hoen, 2006). The R&D 
environment is risk averse and the patent system provides inadequate rewards for the 
more risky first-in-class products (Love, 2004). This results in a steady stream of 
pharmaceutical products concentrated within the same therapeutic areas, each offering 
only slight incremental improvements. 
One study decisively illustrates the neglect of diseases of the poor. Between 
1975 and 2004, 1556 new chemical entities were marketed. Out of this number only 
21 were found to target neglected diseases. This small number accounts for only 1% 
of all pharmaceutical development over the past thirty years (Trouiller et. al., 2002; 
Chirac & Torreele, 2006).29 Out of the 1393 products registered between 1975 and 
1999, drugs for cardiovascular and central nervous system diseases accounted for 
                                                 
28 The May 2008 meeting of the WHO’s Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property discussed possible alternative mechanisms. Including previously 
suggested schemes such as prize fund initiatives, the purchase of product patents, open source molecule 
libraries, international R&D treaties and advanced purchasing commitments (Kremer & Glennester, 
2004; Love et. al., 2007; Love, 2006; Cohen et. al., 2006; Dentico & Ford, 2005; Barder et. al., 2005; 
DiMasi & Grabowski, 2004; WHO Intergovernmental Working Group, 2008; Grabowski, 2004 ). 
 
29 Neglected diseases are defined here as tropical diseases such as leprosy, African sleeping sickness, 
onchoceriasis, trachoma, buruli ulcer, leishmaniasis, chagas disease, guinea worm, lymphatic filariasis 
and schistosomiasis. The study also included malaria and tuberculosis, which together accounted for 11 
of the 21 new chemical entities marketed (Chirac & Torreele, 2006; Trouiller et. al., 2002). 
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28% of the new chemical entities; 68.7% of the 1393 registered products presented 
little or no therapeutic gain compared with what was already available (Trouiller et. 
al., 2002).   
For diseases prevalent in both developed and developing countries 
(cardiovascular disease, central nervous system disease and cancer) innovation is 
assured. Developing countries are seeing an increase in the prevalence of chronic 
diseases. Issues of pharmaceutical security should be less problematic in these 
therapeutic areas as the pharmaceutical industry can be certain of considerable levels 
of profit in the developed world markets and thus are likely to be willing to provide 
price reductions or licenses for generic production in poor countries. The diseases that 
are neglected are those with exclusive demand from the developing world. 
There is a distinct danger that patients in developing nations will become 
‘therapeutic orphans’ if the pharmaceutical industry lacks suitable incentives (285 
Resnik, 2001). A fundamental premise of global pharmaceutical delivery must be that 
not all products are of equal value. Whilst premature balding or social shyness are 
unfortunate for an individual they are not threats to personal health. By contrast, 
neglected tropical diseases can devastate whole populations. A system must be found 
that can make tropical diseases, as well as malaria and tuberculosis, as lucrative for 
the pharmaceutical industry as those pseudo-medical conditions found in wealthy 
markets. Anything less is not merely a failure of the market but a moral and political 
failure.   
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Chapter Four: The Law and Medical Geopolitics 
 
 
Achieving healthcare equity in South Africa has been one of the main focuses of the 
post-apartheid government. The government inherited a health system that functioned 
only for a small minority of the population. As such the government’s priority has 
been to redress the imbalances that had become ingrained in the health system. This 
has had to be done in the face of the HIV/AIDS epidemic that has swept through 
Southern Africa. Improving access to medicines is a key mechanism through which 
the government can make an impact on health in South Africa.  
The South African health challenge 
 
South Africa faces a vast number of ongoing health problems, the most  pernicious  
being HIV/AIDS. Whilst the pharmaceutical policies adopted by South Africa impact 
upon the access and availability of all medicines, they have largely been guided by the 
recognition by activists and, latterly, government that a medicines delivery system 
must be established that is capable of halting the advance of HIV/AIDS. The 
emergence of the South African HIV/AIDS crisis was perhaps the most significant 
catalyst for global pharmaceutical activism (Smith & Duncan, 2005). The 2001 South 
African court case provided the first opportunity for government, domestic civil 
society and global activists to unite in order to express their belief in the connection 
between corporate greed and pharmaceutical delivery. 
 The HIV/AIDS problem has grown steadily in stature in the last twenty years. 
In 1990 when Nelson Mandela was released, HIV prevalence among pregnant women 
in South Africa was estimated to be 0.7%, by 2005 it had risen to 30.2% (Hassim et. 
al., 2007). In 2001, at the time when the government was fighting for its right to 
implement the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, 30% of 
all deaths in South Africa were due to HIV/AIDS (Grimwood et. al., 2006).30   
According to recent figures released by the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) 7.6 million South Africans are HIV positive – 2.2 million more than the 
                                                 
30 The distribution of deaths from HIV/AIDS is not uniform across South Africa; there are considerable 
geographical disparities. In the year 2000, 8.4% of deaths in the Western Cape were attributable to 
HIV/AIDS, whereas 41.5% of deaths were HIV/AIDS related in KwaZulu-Natal (Grimwood et. al., 
2006). 
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South African Department of Health figures for 2007. Of these, about 6.1 million are 
the economically active people between the ages of 20 and 64 (Momberg, 2008).31 In 
the year 2000, the International Labour Organization estimated that due to AIDS 
South Africa would lose 24.9% of its workforce by 2020 (Barnard, 2002).32 For a 
country in a period of transition the loss of a quarter of one’s workforce to a single 
disease is potentially devastating. After an agonisingly slow start the government has 
been forced to tackle the scourge of HIV/AIDS head on. 
Health policy in the apartheid era, like all government action, served the 
dominant objective of maintaining economic and political supremacy for the minority 
white population. Its purpose was to maintain a difference in the quality of life of 
different population groups and so promote voter support for the National Party 
(McIntyre & Gilson, 2002). With the end of apartheid in South Africa, democratic 
considerations such as fairness, equitability, accountability and transparency entered 
into government (Sprague & Woolman, 2006). It is important to recognise that after 
only fourteen years of a newly democratic South Africa, many of the processes aimed 
at redressing the ills of apartheid are still ongoing. 
As political transition approached, a progressive health movement developed, 
comprising health activists, academics and returning exiles. A purposeful effort was 
made to prepare the liberation movement for its future role as government. In 1993 
the ANC established its own Drug Policy Commission to debate pharmaceutical 
policy issues (Gray et. al., 2002). The National Health Plan for South Africa, 
produced by the ANC in 1994 clearly acknowledges, “every person has the right to 
achieve optimal health” (African National Congress, 1994, p. 9). The South African 
Constitution contains one of the few legally enforceable constitutional rights to health 
care in the world (Sprague & Woolman, 2006; Hassim et. al., 2007; Hogerzeil, 2006). 
Section 27 of the Constitution seeks to redress the past by making a fundamental 
                                                 
31 A number of commentators believe that the DBSA statistics are more reliable than the government 
figures because they were collected from clinics, local municipalities, development planners, morgues 
and funeral homes, rather than being based on estimates. The figures are updated annually, and are 
used by the bank to determine funding for municipal projects (Momberg, 2008). However, it matters 
little whether one uses the government statistics of 5.4 million or the DBSA statistics of 7.6 million,  
for both indicate a health crisis.  
 
32 HIV/AIDS is often not itself a killer, but it lowers the immune system of a sufferer to such an extent 
that other infections, such as pneumonia or tuberculosis, cannot be fought. Predominantly as a result of 
HIV, South Africa is one of the WHO’s 22 high burden tuberculosis countries. In Africa 34% of adults 
newly diagnosed with tuberculosis were also infected with HIV in 2004; in South Africa this figure 
was 55.3% (Grimwood et. al., 2006). Figures for HIV/AIDS related deaths are often underestimated as 
the cause of death is attributed to another condition. 
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break with a healthcare system that had been saturated with immeasurable inequities, 
where the lottery of race, geographical location and income were the primary 
determinants of the quality of health care services received by an individual. Section 
27 confers not only a negative right, under which the state or individuals should not 
adversely interfere with an individual’s right to secure healthcare services. More 
significantly, it confers a positive right to receive healthcare from the state (Ngwena, 
2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Addressing a history of health inequity 
 
Since 1994 the South African government has introduced many new health 
related policies: free primary health care services for all; free health care services for 
children younger than six years, pregnant women and disabled people; a patients’ 
rights charter and other initiatives (Singh et. al., 2007). With increased health care 
entitlements, coverage, and clinic construction, access to medicines became all the 
more important (Bond, 1999). Whilst constitutional obligation guided policy reform 
within the health sector, much of the drive behind new initiatives came from the 
indomitable Health Minister Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma. During her tenure (1994 – 
1999) she was more radical than her ministerial counterparts in seeking social justice 
and redistribution. She enthusiastically challenged powerful health sector interests, 
such as tobacco companies, urban doctors and health insurers (Bond, 1999). The 
pharmaceutical industry could not escape Dr Zuma’s gaze.  
Box 4.1: Section 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
1. Everyone has the right to have access to   
a. health care services, including reproductive health care;  
b. sufficient food and water; and  
c. social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves 
and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.  
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of 
these rights.  
3. No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.  
(Republic of South Africa, 1996a) 
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Table 4.1 Time line of events leading up to the 2001 court case in South Africa 
(Source: adapted from Gray et al 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1996 January – Formal Working Group established to draft legislation. 
February – Launch of the National Drugs Policy. 
 
 
July – Regulations published for comment. 
 
November – Public hearings on regulations, withdrawn in face of opposition. 
                     Draft of Amendment Act completed 
 
1997  
 
May – Amendment Bill tabled (Act 30 of 1997) 
June – Public hearing on Bill. Bill withdrawn. 
July – Rewriting of Bill. 
August – Amendment Bill re-tabled (Act 72 of 1997) 
September – Public hearings.  
December – Bill passed by Parliament as Act 90 of 1997 
1998  
February – PMA institute court action. 
 
May – South Africa placed on the USTR Special 301 Watch List 
 
October – Responding affidavit by Department of Health. 
 
 
1999  
 
 
No visible progress 
 
 
 
2000  
 
May – United States TRIPS plus policy reversed for sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
July – PMA replying affidavit submitted to court. 
 
 
 
2001 January – Court date set. 
 
March – Court case begins. Short postponement. 
April – PMA and Department of Health settle out of court.  
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In 1996 the South African government launched the National Drug Policy, 
strongly resembling a WHO template. Albeit vague and generic in parts, the National 
Drug Policy was comprehensive and clearly signalled the Department of Health’s 
principles and intentions (Gray et. al., 2002). The policy had a number of specific 
objectives: firstly it sought to ensure the availability and accessibility of essential 
drugs to all citizens; and secondly to ensure the safety, efficacy and quality of those 
drugs.  The policy also enshrined specific economic objectives including lowering the 
cost of drugs and establishing complimentary partnerships between government and 
private providers (Republic of South Africa, 1996c). 
  The election of the African National Congress (ANC) to government 
presented a significant window of opportunity in which to implement reforms. 
Governments that replace discredited regimes feel compelled to deliver immediately 
on their election promises. There is not only an assumption that something has to be 
done but that everything can be done. As such there is a danger that government 
policies are seen as good because they are based on the correct principles, rather than 
being technically well developed or because they accommodate a broad coalition of 
interests. The Department of Health has been criticised in some quarters for flawed 
and rushed reforms. By adopting a centralised and uncompromising approach the 
likelihood of conflict increased, and also contributed to repeated technical errors 
making the pharmaceutical policy vulnerable to legal attack (Gray et. al., 2002).  
The Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of 1965 was seen as the 
most effective vehicle for reforming the pharmaceutical delivery system in post-
apartheid South Africa. An Amendment Bill was tabled in the National Assembly in 
May 1997, but it immediately met vociferous opposition and was withdrawn. A small 
working group came back with a new document but the redrafting was minimal. The 
Bill was passed by Parliament as the Medicines and Related Substances Amendment 
Act in December 1997.33 In February 1998, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ 
Association of South Africa (PMA) and 41 co-applicants sought an interim interdict 
from the High Court in Pretoria preventing the President from bringing the Act into 
effect (see Table 4.1).  The PMA CEO stated at the time that the association 
                                                 
33 Thirty-five minute telephone interview with Mr A Gray, Senior Lecturer at the Department of 
Therapeutics and Medicines Management, Nelson R Mandela School of Medicines, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. 17th June 2008. Transcription checked by interviewee and retained by author. For 
more information see Appendix B. 
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supported government aims of redistribution and justice but believed the law was 
poorly constructed (Sidley, 2001). The PMA was obliged to oppose any measure that 
could be harmful to intellectual property rights and thus had the potential to damage 
the basis on which the pharmaceutical industry operates.34  
The Amendment Act regulates and controls all medicinal substances in terms 
of possession, use, sale, manufacture, import, export, cultivation and collection 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2000; Republic of South Africa, 1997). It was 
one particular section of the Act, however, that caused controversy. Section 15C was 
poorly worded and open to a range of interpretations.35 The Section appeared to give 
the Minister of Health wide-ranging powers to introduce aggressive marketplace 
competition to lower the price of medicines: 
 
The minister may prescribe conditions for the supply  
of more affordable medicines in certain circumstances  
so as to protect the health of the public, and in particular 
may…prescribe the conditions on which any medicine  
which is identical in composition, meets the same equality  
of standard and intended to have the same proprietary  
name as that of another medicines already registered in the  
Republic…may be imported (Republic of  
South Africa, 1997, Section 15C). 
 
 The primary mechanism by which to introduce competition was the parallel 
importation of branded pharmaceuticals from other countries. Parallel trade takes 
advantage of the fact that pharmaceutical companies sometimes charge significantly 
lower prices in one country than the other (Mugambe, 2002).36 Parallel importation is 
a pure expression of the free trade principle, but is largely opposed by the 
                                                 
34 Ehrich interview, 5th May 2008 (detailed footnote p 37) and Berger interview, 20th May 2008 
(detailed footnote p. 42). 
  
35 Gray interview, 17th June 2008 (detailed footnote p. 51). 
 
36 Contrary to popular conception, parallel importation does not involve buying from generic suppliers. 
It is simply shopping around for the best price a company charges for a branded drug internationally 
(Love, 2001b). Parallel trade is common practice in the European Union. 
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pharmaceutical industry as it diminishes their control over price regulation within 
different countries.  
Another key mechanism for increasing pharmaceutical security for South 
African patients is generic substitution of brand name medicines. Generic substitution 
requires pharmacists to prescribe a cheaper generic version of a medicine, if one 
exists, when presented with a patient’s prescription (Mugambe, 2002; South African 
Department of Health, 1996).37 Unsurprisingly the favouring of generic versions over 
their brand name counterparts is opposed by the multinational pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 This does not apply to medicines under patent unless a compulsory license has been granted for a 
generic version. 
Box 4.2 Brazil: Political will in a hostile environment? 
 
Brazil provides an example of how a middle-income country can exploit its 
existing industrial and intellectual capacity, as well as its legal framework, to 
ensure availability of affordable generic medicines. Brazilian success is a product 
of a favourable legal system coupled with a progressive social policy, not 
dissimilar to that in South Africa.  
In 1996 the Brazilian government guaranteed all HIV/AIDS patients access 
to treatment and care (Chaves, 2007). By the end of 2001 the occurrence of HIV-
related opportunistic infections was reduced by 60%-80%; mortality rates were 
reduced by 50%; in-patient hospitalisations plunged to 14% of the pre-HAART 
figures, consequently the state saved some $1.1billion (R8.5 billion) from 1997 to 
2001 (Sprague & Woolman, 2006). After the Brazilian government began 
producing AIDS drugs generically, the prices of equivalent branded drugs dropped 
by 79% between 1996 and 2000. In contrast, the prices of drugs with no generic 
competition dropped by only 9% over the same period (Pecoul, 2001). 
The Brazilian success was due to its assertive use of the threat of 
compulsory licenses made credible by the presence of domestic production 
facilities, the majority of which received public funding. Brazil was able to 
negotiate price reductions or voluntary licenses with multinational firms as an 
alternative to issuing a compulsory license (Grace, 2004; Abbott, 2007; Sprague & 
Woolman, 2006). 
There is much to be learnt from Brazil, but South Africa is unable to adopt 
such wholesale reforms. Brazil lacked any meaningful patent system for 
pharmaceuticals prior to 1996, however South Africa has a long established 
intellectual property regime (Grace, 2004). In addition the number of AIDS 
patients in South Africa dwarfs that in Brazil. South Africa would need 
considerably more facilities, at far greater expense, to produce ARVs for all who 
need them (Hanefield, 2002).    
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The most debated issue surrounding the Amendment Act and one that became 
central to the court case in 2001 was whether the Act allowed for compulsory 
licensing.  During the late 1990s the possibilities for significant cost savings offered 
by TRIPS and compulsory licensing came to the forefront of the access to medicines 
debate. This, coupled with increased awareness of the extent of the HIV/AIDS crisis 
and the development of triple combination highly active antiretroviral therapy 
(HAART), created renewed optimism for advocates of pharmaceutical security. The 
hope was that South Africa could follow the example set by Brazil, another middle-
income country, in its supply of medicines to those individuals infected with 
HIV/AIDS  (Box 4.2). This optimism only served to distort the original aims of the 
Amendment Act. 
 
 
 
    
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the Act was introduced the South African government was not pursuing 
a strategy of issuing compulsory licenses on patents. Instead it saw the act as a modest 
effort to introduce United States-style cost savings through the wider use of generic 
drugs and European-style use of parallel imports of cheaper branded drugs (Love, 
2001b). In responding to the PMA lawsuit in 1998 the South African government 
stated that they had no intention of using Section 15C to issue compulsory licenses. A 
curious situation developed in which the government, in order to ‘win’ the lawsuit, 
abandoned any hope of using the Act to issue a compulsory license. Effectively the 
government was arguing a narrow interpretation of the Amendment Act. Conversely, 
the pharmaceutical industry based its case on a broad interpretation, whereby they 
Box 4.3 The PMA objections to the Amendment Act: 
 
1. It enabled and authorised the Minister of Health to unilaterally 
determine the prescribed conditions for the supply of more 
affordable medicines, without setting out guidelines limiting the 
powers granted and depriving companies of their property. 
2. Section 15C enabled the Minister of Health to determine the extent 
to which patent rights would extend irrespective of the provisions 
of the South African Patents Act. 
3. Patent rights could be appropriated without any provision for 
compensation. 
4. In contradiction of TRIPS, Section 15C discriminated against the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
(Satardien, 2006) 
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believed that compulsory licenses could be issued (Love, 2001b; Cleary, 2001).38 The 
controversy over the provision (or not) of compulsory licenses and opposition to the 
powers given to the Minister formed the basis of the PMA court case (see Box 4.3). 
 
The politics of the moral high ground 
 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers were not alone in their criticism of South Africa. They 
were backed by a number of Western governments, including Switzerland, France, 
Germany and most notably the United States. The involvement of the United States 
was a classic instance of states being linked through the ‘internal markets’ of 
multinationals. In line with theories of hegemony within the international political 
economy, the lead up to the 2001 court action clearly demonstrates an attempt to 
subordinate South Africa’s needs in order to benefit the geo-economic aspirations of 
the United States.  
 As a result of considerable lobbying from the pharmaceutical industry, the 
United States applied pressure on the South African government. This included 
putting South Africa on the US Trade Representatives Special 301 Watch List in May 
1998 (See Box 3.1, Chapter Three). It cited South Africa’s inadequate intellectual 
property protection as the reason despite the fact that all the reforms in the 
Amendment Act were TRIPS compliant. An official in the United States Patent and 
Trademarks Office stated “We acknowledge that our position is more restrictive than 
the TRIPS agreement but we see TRIPS as a minimum standard of protection” (Bond, 
1999, p. 775). This statement openly acknowledges that the United States believed in 
‘TRIPS plus’ standards of intellectual property and, more importantly, its actions 
demonstrated that it expected others to follow suit.  
In June 1998 the White House announced that four items, for which South 
Africa had requested preferential tariff treatment under the Generalized System of 
Preferences program, would be held in abeyance pending adequate progress on 
intellectual property rights in South Africa (Bond, 1999; Lanoszka, 2003). The 
international community, quite rightly, interpreted such moves as macroeconomic 
                                                 
38 A number of domestic complexities muddied the waters. South Africa had compulsory licensing 
provision in its existing patent law. The Minister of Health was at odds with Minister of Trade who was 
reluctant to issue a compulsory license under the old patent law, as it offered the possibility of 
litigation. Additionally President Thabo Mbeki’s dissident theories about HIV/AIDS made it difficult 
for officials to discuss initiatives that would make ARVs affordable (Love, 2001b). 
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bribery and were quick to condemn them. By ignoring existing WTO rules in TRIPS 
permitting parallel imports and compulsory licensing, as well as identical provisions 
practised in various areas of US commerce, they sent the message ‘do as we say not 
as we do’ (Bond, 1999).  Whilst such practices are common within the geopolitical 
power plays of the global economy, the South African case incited global outrage. 
The United States, along with the multinational pharmaceutical industry, seriously 
underestimated the opposition they would face. 
By the late 1990s the global activist and academic community had drawn a 
connection between pharmaceutical security and trade policy, particularly intellectual 
property.39 The South African Amendment Act provided the first opportunity for 
these concerns to be voiced. A dry trade issue between two countries that may have 
previously slipped under the radar of non-governmental organisations was now being 
explicitly linked to the supply of life saving medicines. By mid-1999 the issue had 
become about HIV/AIDS.   
The HIV/AIDS epidemic provided a unique environment.40 Up until the mid-
1990s when HAART became available in industrialised nations, AIDS was as much a 
death sentence for a white middle-class gay man in London as it was for a black 
working-class women in Cape Town. The HIV/AIDS epidemic established a 
commonality of experience never seen before, it ignored traditional socio-economic 
barriers such as race, gender, income and sexuality (Schneider, 2002). It transcended 
distance and location; people in the North and South suffered from HIV/AIDS and 
were equally helpless.41 
The court case provided the political moment to focus a global campaign 
(Barnard, 2002). Intellectual property rights activists (such as Consumer Project on 
Technology) teamed up with organisations such as Médicins sans Frontiéres (MSF) 
and Health Action International (HAI) as well as South Africa’s Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC), to deliver their message via the vehicle of HIV/AIDS (McIntyre et. 
al., 2004).42 The years of hostility between the South African government and 
                                                 
39 Berger interview, 20th May 2008, (detailed footnote p. 42). 
 
40 Gray interview, 17th June 2008, (detailed footnote p. 51). 
 
41 The International AIDS Conference was held in Durban, South Africa in June 2000. Access to 
treatment featured very strongly – Berger interview, 20th May 2008. 
 
42 Ehrich interview, 5th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 37). 
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HIV/AIDS organisations were forgotten for the sake of defeating the powerful 
multinationals. A coalition formed around a moral consensus: what had previously 
been a trade issue quickly became politics of the moral high ground (Friedman & 
Mottiar, 2004). 
That the most powerful country in the world would spar with the most 
promising emerging democracy in Africa over access to life-saving AIDS medicines 
was a public relations nightmare for the Clinton administration in the United States 
(Bond, 1999). The case changed from one about a law affecting trade in 
pharmaceuticals, to one of denying AIDS patients life and more dramatically, putting 
Mandela in the dock once again. Nelson Mandela, the great freedom fighter, was 
speaking on behalf of all Non-Aligned Movement countries against corporate greed 
and American neo-imperialism.43 The campaign surrounding the court action 
snowballed, taking on greater significance and symbolism than many expected.  
The United States dropped its stand in 1999. This had much to do with 
demonstrations during the Gore election campaign in which he was confronted at 
election rallies by demonstrators accusing him of killing babies in Africa, and with 
placards reading “Gore’s Greed Kills” (t'Hoen, 2002; Petchesky, 2003). In May 2000, 
the United States ‘TRIPS-plus’ policy was relinquished for sub-Saharan African 
countries (McIntyre et. al., 2004). This was a small victory for the activist community 
and governments striving for pharmaceutical security. It signalled future 
unwillingness on the part of the United States to so enthusiastically and 
unconditionally support the pharmaceutical industry. 
The case finally came to court in March 2001.  By this time, due to its 
vigorous campaigning, the TAC was submitted as amicus curiae (friend of the court). 
The admission of the TAC to the proceedings served to lend not only greater publicity 
to the case but was also seen as a legal acknowledgement of the consequences of the 
court case for HIV positive people (Figure 4.1).  The TAC also threatened to give 
evidence that would lay open to public scrutiny details of pharmaceutical firm R&D 
costs for AIDS drugs, as well as other aspects of the manufacturers’ advertising and 
marketing policies and expenditures (Barnard, 2002).  
Shortly after the trial began it became clear that Section 15C of the Medicines 
Act was modelled on a draft legal text prepared by the World Intellectual Property 
                                                 
43 South Africa took the 3 year leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1998  
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Organisation (WIPO) Committee of Experts. Given WIPO’s involvement, and their 
role in TRIPS enforcement, it was impossible for the pharmaceutical industry to argue 
that the Amendment Act violated TRIPS (Sprague & Woolman, 2006; t'Hoen, 2002). 
The case was settled out of court, barely a month after it began. It was hailed as a 
great victory for the South African government and the activist community. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 4.1 Images from Treatment Action Campaign protests, Pretoria 2001. 
(Source: TAC, www.tac.org.za/photos.html) 
 
The lawsuit ultimately set no legal precedent. It did however alter the balance 
of power within the global pharmaceutical political economy. Developing countries 
saw that they could stand up and win against the multinational pharmaceutical 
industry as long as they remained TRIPS compliant. The activist community saw how 
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effective legal mechanisms could be. In South Africa the Treatment Action Campaign 
along with the AIDS Law Project continues to use the court system successfully to 
gain rights for HIV/AIDS patients, in an approach dubbed “social litigation” (Jones, 
2005). Pressuring a company through the courts, rather than through traditional forms 
of protest, has proved fruitful for a number of civil society organisations across the 
globe.  
The multinational pharmaceutical firms recognized that they had little to gain 
from their aggressive enforcement of publicly unpopular legal positions (Sprague & 
Woolman, 2006). The prospect of 39 companies, whose combined profits far-
outweighed the GDP of South Africa, moving to block access to affordable 
medicines, particularly in relation to HIV/AIDS, did immeasurable damage to 
corporate reputations (Joseph, 2003). The pharmaceutical industry has had to work 
hard to regain the trust of governments and the World Health Organization following 
its humiliation in South Africa. It has done this largely through developing a less 
aggressive stance towards intellectual property in certain therapeutic areas and 
geographical regions and also through increased Corporate Social Responsibility 
projects. The legacy of the 2001 court case is multi-faceted and disputed in many 
quarters. The court case certainly had an impact on the global pharmaceutical political 
economy. The following chapter attempts to identify some of these consequences and 
discusses the sense in which the 2001 court case was only a partial ‘victory’.  
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Chapter Five: The changing geopolitical landscape of 
pharmaceuticals. 
 
 
The South African court action of 2001 was a test case for governments, industry and 
activists. The power dynamic within the pharmaceutical geopolitical landscape 
shifted, only very slightly, away from the traditional centres of power. Although the 
case set no legal precedent it undoubtedly gave the global access to medicines 
campaign the confidence to challenge the major forces within the international 
pharmaceutical political economy. Issues of morality, rights and justice collided with 
law, politics and economics in one spatially and temporally confined moment. What 
had previously been a campaign that was confined to the liberal fringe was now part 
of global ‘high politics’. 
 
The power of law 
 
The 2001 court action demonstrated the potential that judicial and legislative 
mechanisms hold for advancing pharmaceutical security. Whilst the medicines 
delivery system is a truly global operation it is still subject to laws. Regulation of the 
global pharmaceutical industry is geographically constituted. Whilst the flows and 
processes that make up the pharmaceutical international political economy are 
transnational in nature, corporations operate in specific locations across the globe. 
These nodes of activity are subject to law. The South African case showed that 
multinational companies are not above the law and that the nation state has not yet 
been sidelined within the international political economy. 
 Just as multinational pharmaceutical firms are subject to obligations brought 
about by law so are governments. The condition of a government having power over a 
territory is that it upholds the rights of its citizens. In the case of South Africa, these 
rights are enshrined within the Constitution. The duties a government is expected to 
fulfil present activists with opportunities to call an administration to account, if 
necessary through the courts. The global pharmaceutical political economy is subject 
to laws, rights and obligations at every level. In the last seven years these obligations 
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have been grasped by a great number of organisations to enforce justice in 
pharmaceutical provision. 
 South Africa has seen a number of instances in which access to medicines has 
been enforced through the judicial process.  One such instance occurred when a 
coalition of South African non-governmental organisations, led by the AIDS Law 
Project, brought a complaint against the pharmaceutical multinationals 
GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim. In this case the South African 
Competition Act was used, asserting that the firms were pricing three medicines 
excessively, arguing that a right to life should be put before profiteering. The 
Competition Commission investigated and found that there was sufficient evidence of 
excessive pricing, denial of access to an essential facility and engaging in an 
exclusionary act to warrant referral to the Competition Tribunal for adjudication. 
After this finding both companies settled the case in December 2003 (Williams, 2007; 
Singh et. al., 2007). According to the settlement, GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer 
Ingelheim were willing to provide the three drugs to generic manufacturers, Aspen 
Pharmacare and Thembalami Pharmaceuticals, for production within South Africa 
and for export to forty-seven African countries for a royalty of no more than 5% of 
net sales (Sprague & Woolman, 2006).44 Here, a judicial ruling significantly enhanced 
pharmaceutical provision for those infected with HIV/AIDS. 
 South African civil society has also successfully used a rights-based argument 
to force the Department of Health to change its treatment policy. 45 One of the most 
notable examples occurred in December 2001 when the Treatment Action Campaign 
won a lawsuit against the South African Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang, and nine provincial Health Ministers. The case forced the government to 
provide Nevirapine through the public health sector for the prevention of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV. The government previously stated that they had no 
evidence of its safety or efficacy despite numerous studies showing that it could cut 
                                                 
44 Additionally, in early 2008, four South African pharmaceutical manufacturers were found by the 
Competition Commission to be colluding in fixing bids for the supply of medicines through the South 
African tender system.   
 
45 One of the great successes of South African civil society during and following the court case is how 
it has turned the matter of intellectual property into a populist issue. Many of the tactics it used were 
reminiscent of the struggle against apartheid. For example, the Treatment Action Campaign started a 
civil disobedience campaign on March 20th 2003. Hundreds of activists presented themselves for arrest 
and demanded the arrest of the Health Minister and the Minister for Trade and Industry (Achmat, 
2004). 
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transmission rates by up to 50% (Beresford, 2001a; Schneider, 2002; Singh et. al., 
2007). A government is the steward of a nation’s health and, as such, it has a duty to 
do everything within its available resources to provide treatment for its citizens. The 
South African government has been shown that if it does not live up to its obligations 
then it no longer faces merely protests but binding and enforceable judicial reprimand. 
 
The emergence of the global pharmaceutical justice campaign 
 
The global social consciousness that developed around issues of pharmaceutical 
security in the lead up to the 2001 South African court case was reinforced by the 
‘victory’ in Pretoria and has continued to gain strength. The court action had a pivotal 
role for global health activism. Rather than pursuing diffuse campaigns that 
concentrate on abstract global processes there has been greater effort to direct action 
towards single events, specific companies or particular pieces of legislation. Events in 
South Africa highlight how effective a temporally and spatially concentrated 
campaign can be. Whilst transnational processes were implied within the campaign 
conducted by civil society, South Africa provided a specific geographical point to 
which everyone could turn. 
 Since 2001, a number of similar cases have occurred. Civil society has largely 
followed the same model of simultaneous domestic and global action. In 2007, Swiss 
pharmaceutical company Novartis challenged the Section of the Indian Patent Act that 
denied an extension of its patent for a cancer treatment, Gleevec (Dickson, 2007). The 
Indian Patent Act aims to prevent a phenomenon commonly referred to as ‘ever-
greening’, a process by which companies attempt to extend patent life for a treatment 
based on little or no improvement on the previous drug.46 The patent application for 
Gleevec was rejected on the grounds that it lacked increased efficacy (Basheer, 2007). 
The case showed remarkable parallels with the South African court action in that it 
represented a challenge to government legislation based on a belief that India was 
contradicting its obligations under WTO law. In the end, following a global 
                                                 
46 GlaxoSmithKline’s important first line AIDS treatment, Combivir, is another example of an ever-
greening product. In the summer of 2006 following massive protests in Bangalore and Bangkok, 
GlaxoSmithKline withdrew its patent applications in Thailand and India. Combivir was a fixed dose 
combination of two earlier discovered drugs and involved neither newness nor an inventive step. The 
principal new ingredient was silicone, an ineffective addition graphically illustrated by Indian 
demonstrators when they dumped sand in front of GlaxoSmithKline’s offices (Oxfam 2007).  
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campaign, the Indian court rejected the Novartis case. The case was highly significant 
because the Indian generic industry is known as the ‘pharmacy of the world’. Had 
Novartis’ challenge to India’s Patent Act been upheld then it would have limited the 
number of generic medicines available to many countries striving for pharmaceutical 
security. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 ‘Profit Pills’, the slogan of an Oxfam 2006 campaign. (Source: Oxfam, 
www.oxfam.org.uk). 
 
 In November 2006 and January 2007, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for 
two new AIDS treatments and a heart disease medicine. In January 2008 it issued an 
additional four compulsory licenses on cancer medications (Rimmington & 
Weissman, 2008). The Thai action was seen as a breakthrough: it was the first time 
that a license had been issued on second-generation HIV/AIDS drugs which remain 
much more expensive than first-generation treatments in which generic competition is 
robust. It also signalled a refusal by the Thai government to limit compulsory licenses 
to AIDS medications. There is credible concern among the pharmaceutical industry 
and a number of WTO members that if licensing is used indiscriminately then it could 
seriously undermine the patent system. A senior official of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry Association of South Africa (PIASA) believes that the issuing of compulsory 
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licenses in countries such as Thailand and Brazil is merely used as a mechanism to 
drive their local pharmaceutical manufacturing industry.47 There is a risk that a ‘cry 
wolf’ situation could develop if TRIPS flexibilities are overused, and this could lead 
to an erosion of mechanisms available for genuine emergencies.  
In response to Thailand’s issuing of licenses, the multinational firm, Abbott, 
withdrew applications to market seven new medicines in Thailand (Rimmington & 
Weissman, 2008). An extensive campaign was launched by Oxfam and Médicins sans 
Frontiéres, as well as by Thai civil society that concentrated on putting pressure on 
Abbott and encouraging the Thai government to stand firm in the face of pressure 
from the United States and European Union. The latest indications are that the Thai 
government intends to continue producing the generic products under license. 
The incidents in India and Thailand both illustrate how the global medicines 
access campaign questions the orthodoxy of the global pharmaceutical political 
economy. The challenge is most often directed at the intellectual property regime that 
lies at the heart of pharmaceutical delivery, binding national laws with the 
multinational production and supply of medicines.  
The Doha Declaration of 2001 shows a direct causal link with the South African 
court action of the same year.48 Due to the ‘victory’ and the publicity gained from the 
South African Amendment Act dispute, a developing country coalition entered the 
Doha negotiations with confidence. Successes in South Africa and Brazil gave a green 
light to developing countries to move aggressively on the matter of access to 
medicines (Petchesky, 2003). The Doha negotiations, an event that would not 
normally capture the imagination of the public, were placed in the glare of the media 
spotlight with the help of the international NGO movement. The increased public 
pressure was combined with the developing countries operating as one bloc, 
something rarely seen before or since, and proving to be a commanding force (t'Hoen 
2002). As noted in Chapter Three, the Doha Declaration was a seminal moment for 
those seeking global pharmaceutical security: evidently the WTO recognised a 
hierarchy of values.  
 
 
                                                 
47 Ehrich interview, 5th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 37). 
 
48 Berger interview, 20th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 42). 
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Changing the pharmaceutical geopolitical order 
 
Arguably, the Doha Declaration changed the landscape of the international 
pharmaceuticals political economy forever. The pharmaceutical IPE was driven solely 
by property rights and market forces, however following the South African case 
issues of morality and justice increased in significance. The real worry for the 
pharmaceutical industry was no longer South African law but the fact that the access 
to medicines campaign had triggered a much broader discussion about the links 
between patents, the price of drugs and the costs and risks of research (Drahos & 
Braithwaite, 2002; Lanoszka, 2003). The way in which intellectual property was 
enforced was also questioned. The geopolitical order of global health was challenged. 
The heavy-handed tactics of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and 
other Western nations were seen as unacceptable in the sphere of health. The 
HIV/AIDS crisis lent significant weight to this argument, and Western governments 
were shamed into easing their pressures on nations affected by the devastating 
epidemic. 
After the South African court action it became clear that industrialized 
countries that exercised trade restrictions to defend the interest of their multinational 
industries could no longer exert pressure without repercussions at home (t'Hoen, 
2002). The global campaign surrounding access to medicines succeeded in bringing 
South African HIV/AIDS patients into the consciences of the American and European 
electorate. By making the issue one of global significance, all actors within the 
international political economy were tied into a web of morality and justice. 
Geographical remoteness and detachment no longer mattered. In addition to pressure 
at home, industrialized nations were alarmed at the global spread of HIV/AIDS and its 
repercussions for development and security across the world. Consequently, bodies 
such as the USTR have been forced to reconsider their previously unyielding position 
towards intellectual property overseas (Lanoszka, 2003). Multinational 
pharmaceutical firms have found themselves politically isolated, no longer able to 
count on the backing of Western governments. 
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Figure 5.2 Treatment Action Campaign Protest, Pretoria 2001. (Source: TAC, 
www.tac.org.za/photos.html) 
 
The pharmaceutical industry has undoubtedly become less aggressive towards 
developing nations. This softening is a consequence of the absence of unconditional 
backing from industrialized nations, as well as a general recognition that firms must 
be seen to be taking a proactive role in promoting global health. Justice, morality and 
social responsibility have to take a central role within pharmaceutical business plans. 
To the industry’s credit, the majority of companies have responded. 
 Corporations have the capacity to be moral agents. They make decisions that 
have important consequences for human beings (Resnik, 2001). There is growing 
recognition in the pharmaceutical sector that social responsibility makes good 
business sense. The damage done by conflicts, such as in South Africa, to a firm’s 
public relations cannot be underestimated. In a commendably progressive statement 
on the occasion of Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham’s merger in 2001, the 
new CEO noted that, 
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  The pharmaceutical industry today sells 80% of its 
  products to 20% of the world’s population. I don’t  
want to be the CEO of a company that only caters 
to the rich…I want those medicines in the hands of 
many more people who need them (Smith &  
Duncan, 2005, p. 98). 
 
 The pharmaceutical industry’s introduction of ‘justice’ into its lexicon is not, 
however, purely altruistic. A dynamic relationship within the pharmaceutical IPE 
exists between the pharmaceutical industry, activists and governments. This 
relationship is based on the power of those striving for pharmaceutical security to 
instigate legal proceedings, apply public pressure and issue licenses for generic 
production. Whilst wholesale changes to the system have not occurred, the 
mechanisms already in place ensure that enough incentives are present for the prices 
of pharmaceuticals to be reduced. In South Africa, the mere threat of a law providing 
for compulsory licenses and other pro-health mechanisms led to rapid and significant 
drops in the price of patented ARVs. At the beginning of 2001, a triple combination 
therapy cost approximately R3500 per month. By June 2001, the price of the same 
medicines had dropped to approximately R1000 per month (Mugambe, 2002). The 
number of donations of drugs also increased during and following the South African 
court case, although these often had conditions attached (Haffejee, 2003).  One of the 
most significant developments in recent years, particularly in South Africa, has been 
the issuing of voluntary licenses by multinational firms. 
 The increase in voluntary licenses is a consequence of the willingness of 
organisations such as the AIDS Law Project to bring companies to account through 
the courts. Licenses are normally granted in order to avoid court action, thus the 
degree to which they are ‘voluntary’ is debateable.49 They are issued by 
pharmaceutical firms for their branded medicines and allow a named generic 
manufacturer to produce the product. Voluntary licenses avoid legal battles by 
securing multinationals the patent protection they require whilst increasing the 
affordability of a patented medicine (Innovative Medicines South Africa, 2005). With 
                                                 
49 Berger interview, 20th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 42). 
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the increased efforts of the pharmaceutical industry, and the undoubted reduction in 
prices public criticism has started to move away from the pharmaceutical industry and 
intellectual property and towards government (in)action. 
 A number of commentators believe that intellectual property no longer takes 
centre stage and that the pharmaceutical industry is no longer the villain in the global 
debate over access to medicines (Barber, 2001b). New issues now are whether donors 
will supply the money to buy and effectively distribute ARVs as they become 
available at or below marginal cost of production. And if the money is there, what is 
the wisest way to spend it? Should there be an international agency to purchase and 
distribute the drugs? (Barber, 2001b). Persistent attacks on relatively enlightened 
companies such as GlaxoSmithKline and Merck may be seen as a tactic designed to 
achieve by threat what cannot be gained by calls for compassion and international 
solidarity. A danger, however, is that this could reinforce a global political culture of 
blame. Such a culture could needlessly harm pharmaceutical companies which are 
valuable national and international assets (Taylor, 2001). Nation states have the 
mechanisms available to them under international law to lower prices and they also 
must take responsibility for effective pharmaceutical procurement and distribution 
where prices are already affordable. 
Too much emphasis is often put on the pharmaceutical industry to the 
exclusion of the state’s responsibility to its citizens. For example, Oxfam has 
criticised Abbott pharmaceuticals for making their ARV, Kaletra, available at a 
discounted price of $2,200 (R16, 921) per year in Guatemala where the gross national 
income per capita is $2,400 (R18, 497) (Oxfam 2007). The discount clearly still 
leaves a significant number of people without access to medicines, but to what extent 
is a company expected to cut its prices? If a firm reduces its drug price, attempting to 
increase access, but the citizens of a country are still too poor to afford it, when does 
it become the state’s responsibility to improve the economic situation of its citizens or 
a donor’s responsibility to purchase the treatment for the country? A pharmaceutical 
firm is not a charity and whilst they have responsibilities these must be balanced with 
making a profit for their shareholders.              
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“Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory” 
 
 
It would be wonderful, of course, if South Africa’s 
decimation by AIDS could genuinely be blamed on  
greedy firms that might be brought to heal with a  
couple of paragraphs of legislation. Government  
would be spared so many agonising choices… 
(Barber, 2001a, p. 2) 
 
 The South African government basked in the glow of publicity created by its 
‘victory’ over the PMA in the Pretoria High Court. South Africa was the darling of 
the global left and the figurehead of the Non-Aligned Nations: the government of the 
freedom struggle had stood firm against the neo-imperialist pressures of the United 
States and the amoral multinational pharmaceutical industry. 
 Partly as a result of the TAC campaign it was commonly believed that the 
‘victory’ would mean that Section 15C would be used to access generic anti-retroviral 
therapy for South African AIDS patients. Unfortunately, before the last champagne 
bottle had been opened, the government warned against expecting it to provide ARVs. 
The government’s policy remained that ARVs were too expensive and it would 
continue to treat only the opportunistic infections caused by the virus (Baleta, 2001). 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) believed that this was an 
example of the government “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory” (COSATU 
2001). 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s The South African government took a view 
that contradicted accepted scientific orthodoxy concerning HIV/AIDS. The former 
Health Minister, Tshabalala-Msimang50, has continually stated her belief in the 
toxicity of ARVs (Beresford, 2001b). On the other hand she considers garlic, olive 
oil, lemon and beetroot effective treatments for HIV/AIDS. The Minister of Finance, 
Trevor Manuel, is quoted as describing ARVs as akin to ‘western voodoo’ (Jones, 
2005). President Thabo Mbeki repeatedly questioned the link between HIV and AIDS 
                                                 
50Since the completion of the research and following the resignation of President Thabo Mbeki in 
September 2008 and the appointment of Kgalema Motlanthe as interim President a new Health 
Minister was appointed. Barbara Hogan, has already shown far greater commitment to achieving 
pharmaceutical security in South Africa. In fact, upon receiving news of her appointment the TAC held 
a champagne fuelled party outside her house!  
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during his time in office (Mbali, 2004). The UN Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in 
Africa, speaking to the closing session of the XVI International AIDS Conference in 
Toronto, August 2006, observed that 
 
 South Africa…is the only country in Africa…where 
 government is still obtuse, dilatory and negligent about 
 rolling out treatment. It is the only country in Africa  
 whose government continues to propound theories more  
 worthy of a lunatic fringe than of a concerned and  
 compassionate state (Satardien, 2006, p. 5).  
 
The AIDS denialism that has characterised the South African administration is 
driven by a number of factors. First, the South African government appropriated the 
medical findings of certain dissident scientists, to the exclusion of more reliable and 
robust evidence (Mbali, 2004). Due to the lack of resources at the government’s 
disposal and a largely inadequate health infrastructure, the government of 2001 found 
it difficult to even contemplate dealing with a crisis of such magnitude. The 
government has heard only what it wants to hear. By blaming HIV/AIDS exclusively 
on poverty, and furthering a belief that poverty alleviation is the only way to combat 
the virus (it is undoubtedly one way), the government was able to deny its obligation 
to provide ARVs.  
Second, there was a strong belief in a Western conspiracy based on racial and 
sexual constructions of ‘the African’ (Mbali, 2004). Whilst there are some very real 
examples of racism in the history of HIV/AIDS, the government altogether rejected 
the Western biomedical paradigm relating to the virus. Apparent medical solutions to 
HIV/AIDS were rejected as Western medication of poverty and underdevelopment 
(Jones, 2005).  
Third, during the lead up to the court action of 2001, both the United States 
and the pharmaceutical industry showed their opposition to the possibilities of 
compulsory licenses (Mbali, 2004). The government knew that if it issued a license of 
the scale needed to treat all those infected with AIDS in South Africa, the opposition 
from both the United States and the multinational pharmaceutical firms would be 
considerable. By denying the necessity of ARVs the government avoided any 
possibility of conflict. 
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One of the ironies of the South African court case is that although it brought 
global attention to intellectual property’s connection with medicines delivery and 
highlighted the possibility of TRIPS flexibilities, it had no impact on South Africa’s 
patent environment. The crucial piece of legislation for pharmaceutical intellectual 
property in South Africa remains the Patent Act of 1978, a relic of the apartheid era. 
The South African Patent Act goes beyond the requirements of TRIPS, making a 
compulsory license very difficult and costly to issue. Under the TRIPS agreement 
South Africa would only have to declare the HIV/AIDS crisis a national emergency 
and then issue a compulsory license to import generic ARVs (Barber, 2001a).51  The 
South African Patent Act makes it a far more challenging process. As one case shows, 
in March 2001 Cipla Ltd, an Indian generic manufacturer wrote to the South African 
Department of Trade and Industry asking for a compulsory license to sell up to eight 
AIDS drugs available at the time only from the patent holders. Cipla was to sell these 
treatments at approximately $400 (R3,083) below the price offered by most 
multinationals. Unfortunately under the existing domestic patent law it would have 
been illegal to issue a license, to the detriment of health in South Africa (Mugambe, 
2002).   
A possibility for South Africa might be to reform its patent law so that it came 
in line with the minimum standards enshrined within the TRIPS Agreement. The 
struggle over the Amendment Act and the Novartis court case in India illustrate 
however, how difficult this would be. Any reform would surely come under 
considerable pressure from various quarters. Whilst the 2001 court action can be seen 
as a success in many ways, the reluctance of the South African government to step out 
of line concerning intellectual property must be considered a victory for the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
As discussed in previous chapters, an individual’s health is inseparable from 
the economic, political and social processes that surround him or her, the ‘body 
politic’. The health policies followed by a government are inextricably tied to both 
domestic economic decision and macroeconomic phenomena.  South Africa’s 
economic development path has closely followed the neo-liberal doctrine advocated 
                                                 
51 In June 2008, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies called for 
HIV/AIDS to be deemed a global disaster. The Federation believes that the United Nations definition 
of a disaster should be applied to HIV/AIDS. The United Nations defines a disaster as “any serious 
disruption of the functioning of a society, causing widespread human, material or environmental losses 
which exceed the ability of a society to cope using only its own resources” (International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2008, p. 3). 
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by Western governments and the WTO. At the time of the 2001 court case South 
Africa was regularly hailed as an exemplary observer of the Uruguay Treaty 
commitments, including TRIPS. As such the South African government did not want 
to engage in any activity that would call its ‘model WTO citizen’ status into question 
(McIntyre et. al., 2004). This has been reflected in its conservative pharmaceutical 
policy, particularly when considering intellectual property.  
Following South Africa’s emergence from apartheid the government adopted 
strict macroeconomic policies demanding fiscal restraint and liberalization of markets 
(Sanders & Chopra, 2006; South African Department of Finance, 1996; McIntyre & 
Gilson, 2002). These principles were enshrined within the policy document entitled 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). GEAR was an attempt to guide 
South Africa through its difficult transition period, yet, it has been accused of 
excluding the government’s pro-equity principles in favour of an emphasis on 
efficiency. In an attempt to contain spending, basic social services were privatised and 
social spending (including on health) was reduced. The stagnation of overall 
expenditure has made achieving equity in the health sector extremely difficult 
(McIntyre & Gilson, 2002; Mbali, 2004; Sanders & Chopra, 2006; Republic of South 
Africa, 1996b). The government’s reluctance to spend on ARVs can be positioned 
within this neoliberal rubric. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the government has operated to the 
best of its abilities within the constraints of a globalised economy. Defying the 
pharmaceutical industry’s intellectual property rights would have very real 
consequences. For example the government would likely have faced trade sanctions, 
and been forced to increase taxes to pay for growing expenditure on medicines 
procurement, which would in turn discourage investment (McIntyre et. al., 2004; 
Cleary, 2001; Mbali, 2004). Such defiance was not an option for South Africa as it 
left apartheid behind and tried to establish itself within the international political 
economy.  
Pharmaceutical security cannot be analysed in isolation. The provision of 
affordable medicines is part of a balance between numerous concerns at the macro 
and micro level of the political economy. For a country in transition, such as South 
Africa, the demand for equitable distribution of resources is vast, ranging from 
education to housing, employment to health. The South African government has made 
progress in the health sector since 1994 (although not as much as it could have), and 
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in recent years it has become more responsive towards pharmaceutical equity and the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, yet challenges remain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 An idealised sequence towards pharmaceutical price reductions, globally 
(A) and in South Africa (B). (Source: based on Vachani & Smith, 2004). 
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Progress: pharmaceutical policy in South Africa 
 
It took a further three years after the court case was dropped for the full package of 
reforms laid out in the Amendment Act to come into force on 2nd May 2004 – almost 
six and a half years after Nelson Mandela signed the Amendment Act of 1997 
(Hassim et. al., 2007).  Despite the delays and bureaucratic inefficiencies that 
pharmaceutical policy has had to endure in South Africa, progress has been made. 
The pharmaceutical production network consists of a vast number of stakeholders, all 
seeking to maximize their profits, an arrangement which can considerably distort 
medicine prices. One of the most significant developments since 2004 has been the 
founding of a pricing committee. It signals a recognition by the government that the 
affordability of a medicine is dependent upon eliminating excessive profits and 
perverse incentives throughout the production network, from factory to pharmacy. 
Before the introduction of pricing regulations South Africa had one of the 
highest fees in the world for the distribution component of the pharmaceutical supply 
chain (Dumnett, 2002). Pharmacists were able to charge a dispensing fee based on a 
percentage of the Rand value of the medicines they sold, providing a perverse 
incentive for pharmacists to stock and sell the most expensive medicines (Kahn, 2003; 
McDonald, 2004). From 2004 the pricing regulations established a flat rate dispensing 
fee for pharmacists, eliminating their percentage cut and increasing price transparency 
(Dumnett, 2002; Tshabalala-Msimang, 2005).52 The government has been accused of 
concentrating too much attention on the end of the production network to the 
exclusion of the ex-manufacturer price, which may be considered more influential to 
the affordability and availability of medicines (Williams, 2007).53 The pricing 
regulations do, however, extend to ex-manufacturer pricing. A single exit price was 
established for each medication and price lists have been made available to the public 
(Kahn, 2003; McDonald, 2004; Tshabalala-Msimang, 2005). The primary 
mechanism, nevertheless, is market based and driven by retailer demand. Since it is 
no longer as profitable to sell higher-priced drugs, the hope is that the market should 
shift towards cheaper generic pharmaceuticals. 
                                                 
52 The retail pharmacy industry vehemently opposed the reform, believing the dispensing fee to be too 
low. The pricing regulations were challenged but upheld in the Constitutional Court at the end of 2005. 
In 2006, the dispensing fee was once again challenged in the courts, but was upheld (Williams, 2007). 
 
53 Berger interview, 20th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 42). 
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If a government makes a political commitment to buy medicines for a certain 
therapeutic area, it creates a market. Private companies will respond to this market. 
This is one of the most explicit examples of the link between politics and economics 
within the global pharmaceutical delivery system. Since the Millennium there has 
been a considerable increase in the volume of international donor funds for health 
(Vachani & Smith, 2004). This has coincided with greater commitment from African 
countries towards health, enshrined within the Abuja Declaration of 2001 in which 
countries pledged to allocate 15% of their national budgets to health care (African 
Union, 2001). The private sector will respond when a market is stimulated, whether 
this is through domestic or international commitment. Since the beginning of the 
century multinational pharmaceutical companies have cut prices considerably as they 
know they have a secure and extensive market, particularly for HIV/AIDS treatments. 
On the 8th August 2003, the South African government finally made a 
commitment to provide ARVs for free in the public sector. The Operational Plan on 
Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment for South Africa, 
followed in November. The plan made an ambitious commitment to provide ARVs 
for over one million people by the 2007/2008 financial year (Hassan, 2005). Although 
in April 2008 the public sector was providing ARVs for only 478,000 people (South 
African Department of Health, 2008). Despite the failure to meet its target, this figure 
constitutes the highest number of people initiated on ARV treatment in any single 
country. The government has also succeeded in stimulating competition for its ARV 
tender. South Africa has the highest number of people infected with HIV/AIDS in the 
world, consequently when its government commits to providing treatment through the 
public sector, generic as well as brand name manufacturers respond. 
In June 2008 the South African Department of Health awarded a tender worth 
R3.6 billion (US$478 million) over two years for the procurement of antiretroviral 
drugs. The tender is spread over six suppliers but dominated by two South African 
firms, Aspen Pharmacare (with over half the total tender) and Adcock Ingram. The 
price of most items is lower than it was in the 2005 tender. The percentage decrease 
ranges from 20% to 71%. The government attributes the reduction to higher volumes, 
and increased generic entry leading to a more competitive climate (Republic of South 
Africa, 2008). 
 Increased generic entry has partly been stimulated by the generic substitution 
policy in the Amendment Act. With doctors and pharmacists prescribing the generic 
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version of products, generics now account for over half the pharmaceuticals 
consumed within South Africa.54 The generic substitution policy, coupled with the 
Competition Act of 1998 has contributed greatly to increasing the affordability of 
medicines by encouraging generic competition.55 Parallel importing, another much 
heralded mechanism for improving access to medicines, has never been used by the 
South African government despite the fact that it has legislative approval.56  
The generic substitution policy, competitive tendering process and donor 
commitments are all effective pull factors within the pharmaceutical production 
network. In order for the South Africa pharmaceutical industry to grow, however, it is 
necessary to deploy push and pull mechanisms simultaneously. The direct 
quantifiable economic benefit of the research based pharmaceutical sector to the 
South African economy was calculated at R10 billion for 2006. The potential for 
further growth is vast considering South Africa’s strategic importance within a 
continent wracked by disease and desperate for a sustainable supply of medicines. As 
such the pharmaceutical industry has been deemed a lead sector in South Africa’s 
Industrial Policy Action Plan (Republic of South Africa 2007a).57 The National 
Industrial Policy Framework, of which the Industrial Policy Action Plan is a part, 
seeks to diversify the South African economy towards high value-added goods and 
services. Crucially, rather than the government financing a broad sector, it will 
concentrate its resources on supporting specific activities (Republic of South Africa, 
2007a). The production of ARVs is seen as a specific strategic activity that the 
government will support, partly through the tender process but also through its 
Strategic Investment Programme (Republic of South Africa, 2007a, 2007b).58 
The Framework states that a coherent approach should be taken across 
government. For example, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) should work 
                                                 
54 Gray interview, 17th June 2008 (detailed footnote p. 51) and Ehrich interview, 5th May 2008 (detailed 
footnote p. 37). 
 
55 Berger interview, 20th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 42). 
 
56 Gray interview, 17th June 2008. 
 
57 Beaumont interview, 5th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 43). 
 
58 The Strategic Investment Programme and the promise of a full scale national rollout of ARVs 
induced Aspen Pharmacare to invest R182 million in a manufacturing facility in Port Elizabeth capable 
of producing significant amounts of generic ARVs. Due to this investment, Aspen has secured a 
number of voluntary licenses from multinational firms (Sprague & Woolman, 2006).  
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closely with the Department of Health (DoH) in relation to pharmaceuticals, 
something that they have previously failed to do, much to the frustration of the 
pharmaceutical industry. The South African pharmaceutical industry indicates that the 
DTI has been very supportive of the industry due to the considerable foreign 
exchange that it brings into the country. The industry’s relationship with the DoH, 
however, has been more challenging. The industry believes that a muddled 
arrangement of price regulations and an inefficient regulatory environment have made 
it increasingly difficult to operate in South Africa.59 As with any industry, 
pharmaceutical firms require a predictable environment. Uncertainty is likely to result 
in less research and the registration of fewer medicines, ultimately harming patients.    
A clear pharmaceutical policy that runs across government departments would 
greatly benefit the pharmaceutical industry in South Africa. Even without this, 
however, there are signs of growth. The total value of exports from the research based 
pharmaceutical sector was approximately R414 million in 2006, compared to R122 
million in 2003, growth of approximately 240% (Deloitte Consulting, 2007). There 
are indications of a deliberate approach to building the country’s manufacturing 
capacity in niche areas related to tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS. The target is to 
make South Africa a centre of excellence in these fields. 
The majority of multinational pharmaceutical firms are present within South 
Africa due to its favourable market and location for onward expansion into Sub-
Saharan Africa. Some firms have maintained their manufacturing facilities whilst 
others use South Africa as their distribution and management centre for Southern 
Africa (Deloitte Consulting, 2007). With appropriate government policies, such as tax 
relief, investment credits and technology transfer (Sprague & Woolman, 2006), the 
pharmaceutical industry in South Africa could gain a comparative advantage as a 
producer of low cost pharmaceuticals to the rest of the continent. The possibility of 
South Africa becoming Africa’s pharmacy, and the benefits this might have, are 
discussed in the following chapter.    
                                                 
59 Beaumont interview, 5th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 43) and Ehrich interview, 5th May 2008 
(detailed footnote p.37). 
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Chapter Six: Achieving Pharmaceutical Security in 
Africa 
 
In the eyes of Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen, freedom is development 
(Sen, 1999). Health is intrinsically tied to freedom and thus is a central pillar of 
development. A healthy individual is free to accomplish and contribute far more than 
a person who is unhealthy. Issues of freedom, justice and responsibility are 
inseparable from each other and as such must dominate any discussion of 
development and the international political economy. 
 Three of the United Nation’s eight Millennium Development Goals are health 
oriented – reducing child mortality among children under five, reducing maternal 
mortality, and reversing the spread of communicable diseases, specifically 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (Bradford, 2007). It is no coincidence that 
Africa, the continent most blighted by disease and ill health, is also the continent with 
the most significant development challenges. Improving the health of Africa’s 
population is inseparable from increasing African economic growth and political 
stability. Achieving pharmaceutical security for Africa would greatly ease the burden 
on the continent. 
 
Africa’s challenge 
 
The African disease burden is crippling the continent. The devastating burden of 
HIV/AIDS and a multitude of other infectious diseases in Africa reinforce a 
geography of global inequality, whilst simultaneously shaping local development and 
governance initiatives (Jones, 2005). Disease prevalence within the region envelopes 
all other concerns, from education to industrial development. The omnipresence of 
largely preventable diseases necessitates pharmaceutical security in Africa. 
Life expectancy in Africa stands at thirty-nine years, considerably lower than 
any other region (Orbinski, 2007). This is largely due to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
in the continents southern region. A conservative projection holds that one in three 
fifteen year olds in the region will die of AIDS (Joseph, 2003). The number of 
shocking statistics relating to the African disease burden, and specifically HIV/AIDS, 
is heart rending. Whilst death is the most definitive consequence of illness and 
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disease, incapacity is also a significant issue. The malaria parasite, which in most 
cases is not life threatening, can seriously hamper a person’s ability to work and 
contribute to a household. The Ugandan government estimates that the average 
Ugandan has six episodes of malaria each year. It estimates that workers suffering 
from malaria can be incapacitated for five to twenty days. A study in Apac, Kampala 
and Rukungiri Districts showed that malaria was responsible for 54%, 33% and 50% 
respectively of absenteeism from work per month (Ugandan Ministry of Health, 
2008). 
Despite high burdens of illness, it is estimated that 50% to 60% of the African 
populace lack access to essential medicines (Tetteh, 2008; WHO, 2007). In Sub-
Saharan Africa it is estimated that only 28% of people with AIDS have access to 
ARVs (Forman, 2007; UK Department for International Development, 2008). Whilst 
this figure is disturbingly low, it is a vast improvement – in 2004 there were only one 
hundred thousand people on ARV therapy in Sub-Saharan Africa, but four years later 
there are over one million people (UK Department for International Development, 
2008). A significant proportion of this increase is due to South Africa’s commitment 
to public sector ARV supply. Estimates show that in Sub-Saharan Africa, ARVs 
combined with effective prevention strategies could save up to ten million lives over 
the next fifteen years (Forman, 2007). In order for Sub-Saharan Africa to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals, there must be greater commitment to provide ARVs 
to those who need them. 
The signs, however, are not positive. Treatment for HIV/AIDS is relatively 
expensive and logistically problematic. In contrast, vaccine delivery is inexpensive 
and needs little follow up. Despite this, coverage with the six basic vaccines of 
childhood has stagnated in almost every region in the world since 1990 with Africa at 
a disturbingly low 50% to 60% take up rate (Labonte et. al., 2005). If fairly basic 
vaccine programmes are failing to be delivered, despite the fact that vaccines are 
readily available, then one must question whether resource intensive HIV/AIDS 
programmes can be sustained.  
The problem of access to pharmaceuticals in Africa is similar to the problem 
of famine, addressed in Chapter One. In many cases pharmaceutical famine results not 
from a shortage of medicines, but from a government’s failure to distribute drugs so 
that people can buy them (Drèze & Sen, 1989; Barnard, 2002). In some cases, as has 
already been shown, there is a lack of affordable pharmaceuticals at the ex-
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manufacturer level (such as second-line ARVs and treatments for neglected diseases). 
In the majority of cases, however, particularly when one considers those drugs on the 
WHO’s Essential Drugs List, medicines are readily available and accessible if 
adequate sums of money are committed to their procurement. The average health 
spend per person per year in the United Kingdom is £1,400 (R21,366), in Sub-
Saharan Africa it is just £5 (R76.50), the WHO recommended minimum is £17 
(R259.87) (UK Department for International Development, 2008). In such an 
environment very few pharmaceuticals, whether they are discounted or donated, can 
get to patients.  
 
Figure 6.1 Cartoon representing the priorities of some African governments towards 
weapons rather than social services, including health (Werner et. al., 1997, p. 85) 
 
African governments are frequently criticised for not allocating adequate 
resources to health. At the time of the 2001 court action the South African 
government came under fire from the Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers 
of America  (PhRMA) and the United States government when it spent $1.3 billion 
(R10 billion) on a submarine and fighter planes, yet only allocated $3 million (R23 
million) to AIDS treatment in the same year (Barber, 2001c). Western governments, 
however, should be cautious in their criticism. Africa spends almost $15 billion (R116 
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billion) a year, four times what it spends on health and education, servicing the debts 
it owes to those states that are so quick to condemn them (Labonte et. al., 2005). Debt 
is part of the body politic. Macroeconomic processes, largely enforced by Western 
governments, are directly related to a government’s capacity to provide 
pharmaceuticals for its citizens. 
Unfortunately the meagre resources the average African government allocates 
to health are often lost through various leakages in the system. In Rwanda it is 
estimated that 27% of health spending is on administration costs (UK Department for 
International Development, 2008). Bureaucratic inefficiencies and dysfunctional 
institutions account for a considerable proportion of health care funds (Weissman, 
2008).  Such inefficiencies seriously limit the functioning of competent 
pharmaceutical procurement. In addition prices are inflated as the drug moves along 
the delivery system. By the time a medicine gets to a patient it often costs two to three 
times the ex-factory value (Health Action International, 2007). 
Corruption and the theft of drugs from the production network is also a serious 
problem in many countries (Figure 6.2). A recent survey in Nigeria shows that 
twenty-eight public health centres received no drugs from the federal government 
over a two-year period. In 2007 the Director General of Nigeria’s National Agency 
for Food and Drug Administration and Control disclosed that it was common for 
donated drugs to be stolen and resold in the open market. With incidents such as this 
in mind, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has considered 
suspending two grants to Nigeria totalling $80 million (R616 million). The Fund has 
already terminated grants to Uganda and Chad due to mismanagement and corruption 
(Weissman, 2008). In Ghana a new breed of unregulated itinerant drug vendors has 
emerged as alternative health providers in the absence of other sources (Parry et. al., 
2004). A thriving trade in black market medicines drives a ‘pirate’ drug industry 
selling counterfeit drugs which at best have no therapeutic benefits and at worst can 
be extremely harmful.  
Furthermore, many African countries face a plethora of obstacles within their 
health care infrastructure. There are very few hospitals and clinics, and those that do 
exist may not have the necessary equipment, electricity or clean water. Communities 
are isolated as roads are of poor quality. There is a desperate lack of healthcare 
professionals, and those are concentrated in urban areas (Parry et. al., 2004; Sanders 
& Carver, 1985; Sanders & Chopra, 2003; Association of the British Pharmaceutical 
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Industry, 2007; Curtis, 2004; Ayodele, 2008).60 As a consequence of so many diverse 
challenges, securing pharmaceutical security within Africa relies on more than just the 
benevolence of the pharmaceutical industry. Ensuring justice within medicine 
provision requires a concerted effort from all stakeholders within the global 
pharmaceutical political economy. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 “Our Health is Our Wealth; Stop Stealing Drugs”. A sign produced by the 
Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda outside the Parliament building Kampala 
(Source: Author, November 2007). 
 
 The following section proposes three ‘solutions’ that could potentially 
enhance pharmaceutical security in Africa. The suggestions are certainly not 
exhaustive. Solving the problems of medicines access on the continent requires far 
greater investigation than this thesis can provide. The recommendations are based on 
the previous analyses of the pharmaceutical political economy, and as such operate at 
three different scales: the national, regional and global. Crucially, the three ‘solutions’ 
are self-supportive. It would be very difficult for one measure to fully function 
without the others, as such a coordinated approach is required.  
                                                 
60 Worrall interview, June 2006 (detailed footnote p. 26). 
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Solution 1: Putting health higher on the African agenda  
 
For many years African public health systems have been neglected. This neglect can 
be attributed to various factors, ranging from the imposition of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes to government mismanagement and investment in prestige projects. 
Thirty years ago the trend was highlighted of building ‘disease palaces’ (large 
hospitals) in urban centres. At the time the cost of financing one bed in the 
Parirenyatwa hospital in Harare, Zimbabwe, was equal to the cost of running a rural 
health centre. The capital involved in the construction of a new teaching hospital in 
Lusaka, Zambia, would have financed the building of 250 health centres, which could 
have catered for the entire population (Sanders & Carver, 1985). In recent years, 
however, focus has shifted towards effective healthcare spending, including 
sustainable pharmaceutical procurement. Sadly, in the case of access to medicines and 
health care in general, it has taken millions of deaths from AIDS before governments, 
as well as donors and the pharmaceutical industry, decided to take substantive action 
(Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002). 
 In April 2001, barely a month after the South African court case was settled, 
the African Union (AU) produced the Abuja Declaration in which it committed states 
to increasing their health care spending to 15% of their annual budgets. It also 
recognised that reversing the HIV/AIDS epidemic, tuberculosis and other infectious 
diseases should constitute the AU’s top priority for the first quarter of the century. 
The Declaration proclaims that AU member states “resolve to enact and utilize 
appropriate legislation and international trade regulations to ensure the availability of 
drugs” (African Union, 2001). This statement implies that countries are committed to 
use the flexibilities allowed for in TRIPS, such as compulsory licensing, parallel 
importing and generic substitution. Unfortunately, however, African countries have 
used few if any of these mechanisms. At the WTO General Council Meeting in May 
2005, following the second extended deadline for a permanent amendment to the 
TRIPS Agreement being missed, the Swiss representative expressed his dismay that 
developing countries were haggling over the wording of a permanent amendment 
while the temporary system remained unused (McBeth, 2006).  
Whilst the systems may not be perfect, there are still plenty of opportunities 
for a country of limited resources to use the TRIPS flexibilities to enhance 
pharmaceutical security. This is particularly true following the 2001 court action, 
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governments can be sure of support from a strong global activist movement, the WHO 
and WTO. It is also unlikely that the pharmaceutical industry would seek to challenge 
African governments if they introduced flexibilities, due to the minimal significance 
of the African market. It is in no one’s interest for the public health measures in the 
TRIPS Agreement to lie dormant. 
In 2007 the African Union Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan was produced. 
The plan argued for regional production of pharmaceuticals within Africa (African 
Union, 2007). There are however, a number of prerequisites for the development of a 
pharmaceutical manufacturing base. First, a country needs a chemical industry to 
provide the raw materials required for manufacturing medicines. Second, an efficient, 
corruption free and scientifically rigorous regulatory system must be established to 
ensure safety and efficacy of the pharmaceutical products. Third, a country needs 
technical experts with the appropriate qualifications and experience to go into large-
scale manufacturing (African Union, 2007). The vast majority of African countries 
lack these requirements; realistically South Africa is the only nation that can maintain 
the required scale of pharmaceutical manufacturing. 
 
 Solution 2: South Africa as Africa’s pharmacy? 
 
South Africa certainly has the potential to become a centre of excellence for African 
pharmacology.  India, Brazil and to a lesser extent Thailand cater to a global mass 
generic market. South Africa, however, can limit itself to niche therapeutic areas 
within a specific continental geography and epidemiology. Having a major producer 
of safe and affordable medicines on the continent most in need of pharmaceutical 
security would undoubtedly benefit African health. 
 South Africa is the regional superpower. The country accounts for almost 50% 
of the total economic output of Sub-Saharan Africa (Sanders & Chopra, 2006). As 
such it has the finance, technology and infrastructure to support both a generic and 
research based pharmaceutical industry that is tailored to the needs of Southern 
Africa. As indicated in the previous chapter, South Africa already possesses a robust 
pharmaceutical industry, consisting of both domestic and multinational firms.61 The 
                                                 
61 Adcock Ingram and Aspen Pharmacare, two South African companies, hold 25% of the South 
African pharmaceutical market (Ehrich interview, 5th May 2008, detailed footnote p. 37). Aspen 
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South African government first raised the idea of catering to its African neighbours’ 
pharmaceutical needs in 1994 in the National Health Plan for South Africa and then 
again in 1996 in the National Drug Policy.  It was not until the National Industrial 
Policy Framework of 2007 (see Chapter Five), that a comprehensive industrial policy 
was tabled. 
 Whilst such policy documents are encouraging, locating a regional production 
centre in South Africa has to make business sense. Neither domestic pharmaceutical 
companies nor multinational companies will commit to producing treatments for 
neglected diseases without a guaranteed market. Whilst there is undoubted need for 
the medicines, currently the demand is uncertain. African governments and donors 
have to commit to the purchase of pharmaceuticals before the South African industry 
responds. 
 A coordinated approach is necessary. There is currently no harmonization 
across Africa; a company has to register a product separately in each individual 
country. Additionally, each country has different intellectual property standards. As a 
consequence, even local manufacturers find the African pharmaceutical environment 
a challenge.62 Cooperation between AU members, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), industry associations, donors and NGOs is paramount. In this 
way the regulatory environment can be standardized and efficient distribution 
achieved. There are, however, regional geopolitical obstacles in the way of such a 
response to pharmaceutical insecurity. There have been ongoing attempts for nearly a 
decade to get regional regulatory harmonization. South Africa’s dominance of the 
region has, however, caused problems. SADC nations are wary of South African 
hegemony.63 They are concerned their sovereignty will be undermined and, although 
they rely on South Africa, they are nevertheless reluctant to enter any explicit legal 
commitment.  
 As South Africa cannot realistically issue a compulsory license for export 
under its current Patent Act, it must rely on multinational firms issuing voluntary 
                                                                                                                                            
Pharmacare is the largest manufacturer of generic medicines in the Southern hemisphere. In July 2008, 
the firm announced a joint licensing agreement with GlaxoSmithKline, one of the most successful 
pharmaceutical multinationals. The agreement will allow Aspen to penetrate new markets, and greatly 
improve the company’s product portfolio (Khanyile, 2008).  
 
62 Ehrich interview, 5th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 37). 
 
63 Gray interview, 17th June 2008 (detailed footnote p. 51). 
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licenses. The licenses must allow for export into Africa. In addition, multinational 
firms should be encouraged, through tax breaks and other incentives (provided by 
donors or the African community), to locate their research facilities in South Africa. 
The research arms of South African firms such as Aspen Pharmacare and Adcock 
Ingram should also be nurtured. 
  Such suggestions are based on the assumption that the manufacture and 
distribution of pharmaceuticals from South Africa is advantageous. Some people in 
the industry are not convinced about local manufacturing being the answer to issues 
of affordability. In a globalised world geographical distance is less of a barrier to 
distribution due to better transport and communications technology.  
 
  You would think South Africa would be the logical  
source of supply in to Africa, but it’s not except for  
the surrounding territories. The countries like Zimbabwe,  
Namibia, Swaziland will be supplied from South Africa.  
But for the rest, multinationals supply Africa from elsewhere  
in the world.64 
 
The proximity of a manufacturing base to its market does not guarantee greater 
efficiency of distribution. India and China already have established chemical 
industries and significant pharmaceutical capacity. Distribution costs are insignificant 
in relation to the costs of building a new facility, importing active pharmaceutical 
ingredients and training staff.   
 Establishing South Africa as Africa’s pharmacy has to make financial sense. 
The advantages of having an industry focused on African health problems could be 
considerable. The South African economy is sure to benefit from growth within the 
domestic pharmaceutical industry. South Africa must, however, compete against other 
nations within the international political economy in order to attract investment from 
the pharmaceutical industry. The donor community could play a central role in 
establishing a competitive industry on the continent. 
 
                                                 
64 Ehrich interview, 5th May 2008 (detailed footnote p. 37). 
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Solution 3: Donor funding  
 
Donor funding for health has increased in recent years, predominantly due to 
recognition of the HIV/AIDS crisis, but African states require greater commitment 
from Western governments. Between 1990 and 2005, Development Assistance for 
Health increased globally from $2.5 billion (R19.25 billion) to over $13 billion (R100 
billion). Overall, about 10% of Africa’s healthcare expenditure is financed by donor 
aid (Weissman, 2008). Considering the challenges faced by African governments 
assistance will have to increase if any tangible improvements are to be registered. 
African governments face a significant finance gap in their healthcare 
expenditure and this has been widened by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This gap means 
that even if health budgets were radically expanded and all waste and corruption 
stopped, the majority of Africa’s economies could never afford more than a minor 
percent of the cost of maintaining a fully functioning health service (Attaran & 
Gillespie-White, 2001; McBeth, 2006). The only way in which pharmaceutical 
security will be achieved in the region in the short to medium term is if donors 
account for the shortfall. 
After being unveiled with great fanfare in 2003, the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has received only token support from the majority of 
countries (Feuer, 2007). The United States has met only half of its pledge. Other 
nations including Spain, Japan and Germany, are falling behind in their contributions 
(The Global Fund, 2008). To put the commitment required in perspective: if Asian, 
European and North American countries redirected just 1% of the $310 billion 
(R2,392 billion) they spend on agricultural subsidies this would almost double the 
foreign aid spent to control HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (Attaran, 2004). One 
view is that donor inaction reveals a continuation of older representations of Africa as 
‘Other’. A significant body of development literature depicts the continent as devoid 
of sophistication, totally lacking in capacity to deliver treatment and too poor to 
consider technologically advanced and expensive treatments (Jones, 2005). This 
perspective posits that enhancing the availability, affordability and ultimately 
accessibility of medicines is futile as they will be wasted.  Such a view has in the past 
been put forward by the pharmaceutical industry in defence of its pricing practices. It 
was an unfortunate irony, therefore, that by failing to respond to demands for ARVs 
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the South African government only succeeded in reinforcing western donor 
rationalisation (Jones, 2005). 
Achieving pharmaceutical security is not an either/or situation. Capacity 
building and pharmaceutical delivery need to be enhanced in order to improve health. 
The development of infrastructure should not exclude processes seeking to make 
medicines affordable. A coordinated approach that takes a systems perspective is 
required. Such a system should consider both the global pharmaceutical political 
economy and factors within a nation state’s healthcare apparatus. Without a holistic 
approach little progress can be made. 
 
A sustainable global pharmaceutical delivery system 
 
The issues surrounding pharmaceutical security are complex, often specific to a 
certain location and dynamic in their nature. The path towards achieving security can 
be no less dynamic. The drugs that work today will be ineffective tomorrow. 
Consequently the political, economic and legal conditions that facilitate the 
availability of medicines have to be redefined continuously (Shadlen, 2007). A 
sustainable and flexible global pharmaceutical system must be developed. Developing 
such a system is likely to be a lengthy process. 
 The path towards pharmaceutical security can be split into short-term, 
intermediate and long-term measures (Figure 6.3). In the short-term the flexibilities 
allowed for in TRIPS have to be used appropriately and effectively to ensure that 
patients get the most effective treatment available, whether it is subject to a patent or 
not. Such a strategy also requires a degree of reliance on the generosity of the 
multinational pharmaceutical industry. Voluntary licenses and tiered pricing policies 
can greatly enhance access. This is not, however, a sustainable strategy:  
  
  No commercial company can act as a charity without 
  running the risk that it would soon have no more than 
  good intentions to offer either its customers or its owners 
  (Taylor, 2001, p. 630). 
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 Corporations who are willing to sacrifice profits are at a competitive 
disadvantage in the current business climate. Appealing to a corporation’s social 
responsibility “may be whistling in the capitalist wind” (Daniels, 2001, p. 41).  In the 
intermediate and long term, therefore, a more comprehensive and robust 
pharmaceutical network needs to be developed. 
 
   
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 A path towards pharmaceutical security, (Source: adapted from Barnard, 
2002) 
 
 
 In recent years promising signals have emerged that a public health approach 
to access to medicines is being recognised rather than a purely trade based strategy.65 
Needs-driven research and development has been recognised by the WHO and its 
partner organisations as the most effective way of achieving pharmaceutical security 
(WHO Intergovernmental Working Group, 2008). In May 2008 the World Health 
Assembly adopted a global strategy aimed at filling the research gap for neglected 
diseases. The WHO Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation 
and Intellectual Property has been hailed widely as the most significant step forward 
in the quest for global pharmaceutical security since the Doha Declaration of 2001. 
The strategy commits the WHO and its member states to develop incentive schemes 
                                                 
65 Sixty minute telephone interview with Mrs M. Childs, Head of European Affairs, The Consumer 
Project on Technology. August 2006. Transcription checked by interviewee and retained by author. For 
more information see Appendix B. 
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for R&D, improve R&D capacity in developing countries, and secure sustainable 
financing for R&D in developing countries, as well as a number of other mechanisms 
(WHO Intergovernmental Working Group, 2008). The strategy recognises the 
importance of national or regional pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities, whilst 
acknowledging that without enhanced assistance from the international community it 
will be very difficult for regions to make the necessary investment to upgrade their 
capabilities.  
 In the long-term, medicines provision needs to be incorporated into a 
wider development agenda. Fundamental to the whole medicines delivery system 
debate is whether the injustice lies in the price of medicines or in the enormous 
income inequalities that make medicines unaffordable (Brock, 2001). As has been 
noted previously the absence of pharmaceutical security in Africa is inseparable from 
the geopolitical processes and economic forces that shape the current world order. 
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Laureate in Economics, believes that a fundamental change of 
attitude is necessary, in which fairness and justice form the basis of relations between 
the developed and developing world (Lanoszka, 2003). The most efficient and 
sustainable way to establish pharmaceutical security in the African region is to 
address the root causes of the pharmaceutical famine. These root causes lie in the 
inability of a government to provide for its citizens due to poverty. The issuing of 
compulsory licenses and the donation of medicines are only temporary remedies. 
Encouraging pharmaceutical self-sufficiency and purchasing power in the region is 
the only enduring answer to achieving comprehensive medicines delivery.    
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Conclusion 
 
The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, and the 2001 court 
case that it sparked, had little direct impact on enhancing access to medicines in South 
Africa. The Act did not deliver a more progressive intellectual property regime as 
many activists and media commentators believed. If the use of compulsory licenses 
were ever the intention of the South African government, by 2001 it was no longer on 
its agenda. Whereas some measures, such as generic substitution, have enhanced the 
availability of affordable medicines, the Act and the excitement that surrounded the 
court case has not led to significant changes in the South African pharmaceutical 
environment. 
 The court case, however, had less tangible consequences. The legacy is 
predominantly symbolic. The 2001 court proceedings provided a moment to focus a 
global campaign, and a ‘victory’ for the activist community. The case proved to be a 
public relations disaster for the pharmaceutical industry and the Western governments 
that stood behind them. The intimidation that characterised the pharmaceutical 
geopolitical economy was challenged. Pharmaceutical security issues moved from the 
liberal fringe to high politics, whilst being firmly placed in the media spotlight. 
 The ‘victory’ bolstered the global medicines access campaign at a crucial time. 
The court case coincided with an increasing international awareness of the 
significance of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, at the same time as effective treatments were 
being developed. The South African struggle provided a platform for a powerful 
coalition to develop between HIV/AIDS activists and those striving to achieve 
pharmaceutical security. Their causes became inseparable. As such the court case 
became centred on the denial of HIV/AIDS treatment at exactly the time when global 
opinion was most receptive to these issues. 
 An explicit link was made between the court case and the death of those 
infected with HIV/AIDS. Multinational pharmaceutical companies, along with their 
Western backers, were (and in many cases continue to be) accused of murder. For the 
activist community it is always easier to generate support if there is a clearly 
identifiable villain. A campaign needs a focus and multinational firms provide a very 
public target in a world in which NGOs have carefully constructed an anti-corporate 
discourse. It is impossible to excuse some of the heavy handed and cynical 
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machinations of the industry, many of which have been outlined in this study. Yet, 
there must be recognition that without the multinational pharmaceutical industry the 
arguments for medicines security would be null and void, as there would be few to 
secure. Corporations should certainly be held accountable, and due to the nature of the 
product it produces, the pharmaceutical industry holds peculiar responsibilities. 
Indiscriminate condemnation of the industry, however, is potentially counter-
productive. The only realistic way to enhance pharmaceutical security is to work with 
and encourage rather than bite the hand that feeds the global medicines delivery 
system. 
 The research has shown how complex and multifaceted the obstacles are to 
achieving pharmaceutical security. The international political economy approach has 
proven an effective framework for analysing the intricacies of the global medicines 
delivery system. By recognising multiple components, pharmaceutical security has 
been placed in the context of broader issues of health service development. Medical 
Geography with its concerns for health, welfare and equitable distribution of 
resources is an ideal vehicle through which to scrutinise the global pharmaceutical 
political economy. The need for recognition of the geopolitical dynamics of power 
means that there is potential for Medical Geopolitics to emerge as a significant 
contributor to the formation of medicines policy. 
 Adopting a geographical approach in the research has allowed the South 
African struggle for pharmaceutical equity to be placed within a global context. South 
Africa’s attempts to achieve pharmaceutical security have been subject to global 
economic and political pressures. South Africa, however, has not been a passive agent 
within the medicines delivery system. The 2001 court case fed into the dynamics of 
change that have characterised the global pharmaceutical environment in the last 
decade. Many of the flows of power and influence that operated across various scales 
during and following the court action may not have been appreciated had the 
international political economy framework not been used. 
 It is all well and good talking about justice, morality and equity, but how can 
these aspirations be achieved? It is easy to identify injustice and then point fingers. It 
is a far more difficult exercise to find workable solutions to these problems. There 
needs to be a move towards pragmatic liberalism. Multinational pharmaceutical 
companies are here to stay, and are currently the only significant developer of safe, 
effective and innovative medicines. Activist groups, however, gain more publicity 
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attacking pharmaceutical companies than by advocating better incentive systems for 
private developers. Liberal elements often automatically dismiss anything to do with 
profits, the market or big business when considering public goods. It is an almost 
impossible task to wade against the flow of the free market. Consequently the market 
must be used to work for the poor. A middle path must be adopted, based less on 
ideology but on substance - the processes required to achieve pharmaceutical security. 
 The key lies in moderating the excesses of the system. Eliminating the drive 
for excessive profits in the developing world and establishing a system based on 
therapeutic need can achieve pharmaceutical security. Profits and equity should not be 
mutually exclusive. It should, however, be realised that firms must make a return on 
their investment. Doing well (in terms of profits) is a precondition to doing good. 
 Governments and donors have to commit suitable resources to health. The 
agonising and irresponsibly slow response of the South African government to 
HIV/AIDS is unacceptable. Its obtuse attitude towards policies that are almost 
universally acknowledged has been baffling, standing as an unforgivable blemish on 
the post-liberation government’s record. All stakeholders need to take responsibility 
for and make a significant commitment to achieving pharmaceutical security. 
 A consensus must be reached that avoids the dichotomies that have thus far 
characterised the debate over access to medicines. There are very positive signs 
emanating from the WTO’s Intergovernmental Working Group that consensus is 
moving towards a need to align the interests of innovators (profits) with the interests 
of society (new and affordable products). A number of inventive market based 
mechanisms have been proposed that would stimulate research into neglected diseases 
as well as encouraging increased affordability of existing products. Philanthropic 
organisations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates and the Clinton Foundations, as 
well as the British government, have committed significant funds to Advanced Market 
Commitments in an attempt to stimulate innovation by ensuring a profitable return for 
pharmaceutical firms.66 In 2006, the governments of France, Brazil, Chile, Norway 
and the United Kingdom created Unitaid, an international medicines purchasing 
scheme, which aims to provide a sustainable and predictable funding mechanism for 
                                                 
66 Advanced Market Commitments occur when a donor or government declares that if a pharmaceutical 
firm develops a medicine for a specific illness it will purchase a fixed volume of the treatment for an 
agreed price. Such a fixed commitment guarantees a market for a previously neglected disease and thus 
stimulates research.   
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international pharmaceutical procurement. Unitaid is partly funded by taxes on airline 
tickets, and has already made considerable progress. 
 What is certain is that the existing pharmaceutical production network does 
not fulfil the needs of Africa and other developing regions. The burden of change 
cannot and should not be carried by private industry alone. The state must take 
primary responsibility for the health of its citizens. Lack of commitment to health, 
particularly in Africa, is a failure of government. The most efficient and realistic way 
to improve equity is to catalyse and manage demand for pharmaceuticals. This can be 
done through combining political will at a domestic level with greater international 
commitment. If a profitable market is established for treatments for diseases of the 
poor, then the industry is sure to respond. Relying on the good will of private industry 
and asking industrialists and shareholders to forgo profits is not a realistic proposition. 
The only option is a proactive solution in which all stakeholders realise their 
responsibilities towards the health of the global poor, and establish definite 
commitments to the purchase and development of treatments. 
 Any system that deals with social goods pertaining to the health of individuals 
must hold certain ethical considerations at its core. By definition the delivery of 
potentially life saving medicines cannot operate in a climate that does not consider 
justice and welfare as its ultimate objective. Pharmaceutical insecurity is a moral, 
political and economic failure. The belief that morals have no place in business must 
be discarded for the purposes of medicines delivery. A moral political economy that 
adopts a middle path between liberal absolutes of equity and freedom and the 
capitalist dogma of market power is the only way to achieve pharmaceutical security. 
Thankfully, in recent years there have been significant moves down this path, 
however there is still a long way to go. Whilst resolutions are being drawn up and 
declarations published, there are still millions of people waiting for medicines across 
the globe. The world has the resources; it must show that it has the will to provide a 
sustainable supply of medicines to all who need them. The benefits are sure to 
outweigh the sacrifices required to achieve pharmaceutical security.  
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Appendix A 
 
Note on Methodology 
 
Eight interviews were conducted over two separate periods, the first phase 
during June and July of 2006 in the United Kingdom and the second from April to 
July 2008 in South Africa. The interviews were conducted either face-to-face or by 
telephone and followed a semi-structured format. The chosen format allowed for an 
in-depth conversation that was a dialogue rather than an interrogation. The intensive 
nature of the interviews allowed for the identification of processes, activities and 
relationships.67 
Those interviewed were selected for their proximity to the issues and 
unrivalled knowledge of the pharmaceutical delivery system. By talking to informed 
stakeholders a vivid and textured account of the issues surrounding pharmaceutical 
security was acquired, allowing for unexpected details to be unearthed. 
All the interviews were, with the consent of the interviewees, digitally 
recorded. With the permission of the interviewees the recordings were then 
immediately transcribed verbatim and the transcriptions sent to the interview subjects 
for verification. Following this the transcripts were thematically coded and the results 
integrated into the secondary research (literature) findings.  Where individuals have 
been cited or directly quoted in the final paper, the relevant sections were highlighted 
by the author and sent for further verification from the interviewee.  
The process of double verification is consistent with ethical research 
requirements. It was important to ensure that the interviewees were not misinterpreted 
or misrepresented. By asking the informants themselves to check the context within 
which they were cited, the author could not be accused of selectively picking material 
to fit a particular argument, thus preserving the integrity of the research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 For a fuller account of the advantages of qualitative methods (such as semi-structured interviews) see 
Baxter & Eyles (1997), Johnston et. al. (2000), Flowerdew & Martin (2005). 
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Appendix B 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
Name Position & Organisation Date & Place Length 
Mrs V 
Beaumont 
Executive Director, 
Innovative Medicines 
South Africa. (Pretoria) 
May 2008, telephone 
interview,  
45 minutes 
Mr J Berger Head of Policy, Research 
& Communications, the 
AIDS Law Project, 
(Johannesburg) 
May 2008, telephone 
interview,  
40 minutes 
Mrs M Childs Head of European Affairs, 
The Consumer Project on 
Technology (London, UK) 
August 2006, 
telephone interview 
60 minutes 
Ms V Ehrich Chief Operating Officer, 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
Association of South 
Africa. (Pretoria) 
May 2008, telephone 
interview 
40 minutes 
Mr A Gray Senior Lecturer, Dept. of 
Therapeutics & Medicines 
Management, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. (Durban) 
June 2008, telephone 
interview 
35 minutes 
Dr M Kamal-
Yanni 
Health Policy Advisor, 
Oxfam International 
(Oxford, UK) 
June 2006, Oxford, 
UK. 
50 minutes 
Mr C Major Head of Public Affairs, 
AstraZeneca Plc. (London, 
UK) 
July 2006, London, 
UK. 
90 minutes 
Mr M Worall Public Affairs Executive, 
Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry. 
(London, UK) 
June 2006, London, 
UK 
60 minutes 
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